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Franklin A. Gevurtz* 
Abstract 
This Article advocates the abolition of the Revlon doctrine—
the junior partner in Delaware’s corporate takeover jurisprudence, 
which governs certain contests involving auctions and sales of 
control. Revlon arose in the twilight zone created by the overlap 
between defenses to hostile tender offers and efforts by directors to 
avoid or coerce a shareholder vote on corporate mergers and sales 
(shotgun corporate marriages). The narrow holding of the case 
stands for the common sense proposition that if directors decide to 
sell their corporation by choosing between two bids, both of which 
will pay all of the shareholders cash for all of their shares, the 
directors should pick the bid that pays the most cash. The 
problems arose when Delaware courts assumed that the case had 
something to say about situations in which the directors were not 
choosing between two all-cash all-shares bids. Specifically, it has 
been difficult sensibly to decide in which other cases Revlon has 
something relevant to say and to figure out what this something 
is. These problems in applying Revlon are not the typical results 
one must inevitably expect when courts apply any legal doctrine to 
the multitude of grey areas that determine a rule’s scope and 
impact. Instead, they reflect a more fundamental difficulty: The 
doctrine arising from Revlon has no sensible underlying policy 
rationale to guide courts in its application. This is not simply 
because courts and commentators have not articulated a sensible 
policy. Rather, this is because there is no sensible policy that one 
can articulate for Revlon beyond the narrow confines of the 
original decision. 
                                                                                                     
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge 
School of Law. I want to thank my colleague, Brian Slocum, for his helpful 
comments. 
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I. Introduction 
A little over a quarter century ago, the Delaware Supreme 
Court established the twin pillar edifice governing the conduct of 
directors in most takeover contests in the United States.1 The 
primary pillar is the Unocal doctrine2—an elegant, if not always 
elegantly applied, solution to the positional conflict of interest 
besetting directors opposing a hostile tender offer that would 
remove them from power.3 A secondary pillar is the Revlon 
doctrine4 imposing seemingly more demanding standards in 
certain situations involving auctions, the break-up of the 
company, or transfers of control.5 
In Unocal, the court wrote in a situation in which it was 
obvious that the decision would have far reaching implications in 
establishing the rules governing directors in the takeover wars 
raging through corporate America.6 By contrast, the Revlon case 
involved a more specific situation in which directors took actions 
to favor one all-cash bid for the company over another all-cash 
bid.7 As such, the decision could simply have constituted a 
relatively minor refinement of the Unocal doctrine—or even the 
business judgment rule—standing for the proposition that once 
the directors decide to sell their company by choosing between 
two bids, both of which will cash out all of the shareholders, the 
only appropriate goal is to get the most cash for the shareholders. 
It soon became evident, however, that the scope of the Revlon 
decision reached well beyond the narrow confines of the original 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra note 51 (explaining that a majority of public companies 
incorporate in Delaware). 
 2. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
1985). 
 3. See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal). 
 4. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 5. See infra notes 116–32 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon). 
 6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We 
Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 493–97 (2001) (describing the 
business environment at the time and the court’s decision to intervene in 
takeover controversies). 
 7. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (describing the facts of 
Revlon). 
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case to establish a sphere in which a somehow more demanding, 
if utterly ill-defined, standard seemingly supplants Unocal.8 
The succeeding years have not been kind to the doctrine 
arising from Revlon. The boundaries of the area covered by 
Revlon have shifted over the course of cases in unpredictable and 
paradoxical ways to produce a result that seems to call for greater 
judicial scrutiny of directors’ decisions in situations posing less 
danger of directors acting in self-interest, while calling for less 
judicial scrutiny in situations posing greater danger of directors 
acting in self-interest.9 Once entering the area covered by Revlon, 
the actual requirements of the doctrine remain mysterious—even 
to the courts charged with its application—and create perplexing 
anomalies when one seeks to reconcile these requirements with 
the broader doctrines governing directors’ conduct in mergers and 
acquisitions or even more generally.10 Indeed, so nebulous are the 
impacts of triggering Revlon that it may be mislabeling to refer to 
Revlon as establishing a doctrine at all. 
These problems in applying Revlon are not the typical results 
one must inevitably expect when courts apply any legal doctrine 
to the multitude of grey areas that determine a rule’s scope and 
impact. Instead, they reflect a more fundamental difficulty. In 
contrast to the Unocal doctrine, the doctrine arising from Revlon 
has no sensible underlying policy rationale to guide courts in its 
application. This is not simply because courts and commentators 
have not articulated a sensible policy—otherwise this article 
might seek to fill the void. Rather, this is because there is no 
sensible policy that one can articulate for Revlon beyond the 
narrow confines of the original decision. 
It is, therefore, time to wipe away the mistake arising from 
applying Revlon to cover situations beyond its original foundation 
of choosing between two all-cash bids and thereby return 
Delaware takeover jurisprudence to the simpler wisdom of the 
unadorned Unocal test. To reach this conclusion, this Article will 
                                                                                                     
 8. Wags have come to call the cases in which the Revlon doctrine applies, 
“Revlon-land.” See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3280 & n.7 (2013) (describing the use of the term 
“Revlon-land”).  
 9. See infra Part III.A (examining jurisprudence governing the situations 
that trigger the Revlon doctrine). 
 10. See infra Part III.B (examining cases that have applied Revlon).  
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proceed as follows: Part II of this Article examines the context out 
of which Revlon arose. Part III of this Article then outlines the 
problems created by Delaware court opinions seeking both to 
determine the scope of situations covered by Revlon, as well as to 
determine what impact the doctrine actually has. Finally, Part IV 
shows how these problems stem from the lack of any sensible 
reason for having the doctrine. 
II. Revlon’s Origins 
Revlon, like Unocal before it, arose out of the jagged manner 
in which corporate law traditionally divides power between 
directors and shareholders when it comes to mergers and 
acquisitions. The basic model of corporate governance is 
republican: Directors have the power to make decisions;11 
shareholders have the power to choose the directors.12 Sales and 
combinations of corporations depart from this model. Instead of 
lodging the power of decision solely with the directors, corporate 
statutes generally divide the power so as to require mutual 
consent by the directors and shareholders. Directors act as 
gatekeepers who must agree to the transaction.13 Shareholders, 
however, retain a veto, as they must approve the deal.14 
Not surprisingly, this dual consent model has produced 
conflict. Like clashing armies seeking to outflank each other on 
the battlefield, both shareholders and directors have sought to 
limit the other’s veto power and, at the same time, to preserve 
their own. The two contexts for this duel involve directors’ 
                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b) (1984) (“[T]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed 
by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of 
directors . . . .”).  
 12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (“Directors shall be elected by a 
plurality of the votes of the shares . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) 
(“[D]irectors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to 
vote . . . .”). 
 13. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing the directors’ 
role in sales and mergers). 
 14. See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing the 
shareholders’ role in sales and mergers). 
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attempts to preserve their gatekeeping role in the face of hostile 
tender offers and directors’ attempts to limit the shareholders’ 
effective voice in approving the sale or combination of their 
corporation. Revlon arose in the overlap between these two 
situations: Revlon’s directors sought to preserve their 
gatekeeping role over the sale of Revlon by supporting a “white 
knight” instead of a hostile bidder acquiring the corporation and 
did so through tactics that constrained the ability of Revlon’s 
shareholders to decline the bid preferred by Revlon’s board.15 
Hence, in order to understand Revlon we must examine both 
defenses to hostile tender offers (including Delaware’s response in 
Unocal), as well as efforts by directors to circumvent the 
requirement of shareholder approval for the sale or combination 
of their corporation (“shotgun corporate marriages”). 
A. Defenses to Hostile Tender Offers 
1. The Order of Battle 
Acquisitions of corporations over the opposition of the 
targeted corporation’s directors (hostile takeovers) exist by virtue 
of a discontinuity in corporate law. Broadly speaking, there are 
three primary ways in which to structure the purchase of a 
business conducted by a corporation:16 the individual or company 
seeking to acquire the target corporation’s business can have 
itself (if the acquirer is a corporation), or a corporation controlled 
by the acquirer, merge with the target corporation;17 the acquirer 
can purchase substantially all of the assets of the target 
corporation;18 or the acquirer can purchase most or all of the 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (describing the facts of 
Revlon). 
 16. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 1008–16 (4th ed. 
2008) (describing and comparing the three primary methods of conducting an 
acquisition). 
 17. In a statutory merger, two corporations become one, with this surviving 
corporation inheriting all of the assets and debts of both merging companies and 
with the shareholders of the two merging companies receiving shares in the 
surviving corporation or other consideration as provided by the merger 
agreement. See id. at 1008, 1028, 1035 (explaining the effect of a statutory 
merger). 
 18. The corporation purchasing the assets of another corporation may also 
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stock owned by the existing shareholders of the target 
corporation (thereby becoming the majority or sole shareholder of 
the target corporation).19 
Corporation statutes, including Delaware’s, require the 
target corporation’s board of directors to approve either a 
merger20 or a sale of substantially all of the target’s assets21 
before submitting the merger or sale to a shareholder vote.22 This 
means that the target’s board of directors performs a gatekeeping 
function; without the board’s approval there can be no merger or 
sale of substantially all assets. The board’s power, however, turns 
out to be based upon something of a Maginot Line, for corporate 
law contains a gap in the board’s gatekeeping role. An acquirer 
                                                                                                     
agree to assume the debts of the selling corporation, thereby ending up at the 
same place as if the two corporations merged. See id. at 1012 (noting that the 
purchaser often assumes a portion of the target’s liabilities). If the corporation 
selling its assets thereafter dissolves and distributes the stock in the purchaser 
or other consideration it received in the sale among its shareholders, the 
shareholders of both corporations end up in the same position as they would if 
the purchasing and selling corporations had merged. See id. (“If the parties 
undertake these two additional steps, the result of a sales transaction largely 
parallels a statutory merger . . . .”). 
 19. While the acquirer can operate the target as a subsidiary after 
acquiring a majority of the target’s outstanding stock, if the acquirer desires 
100% ownership, or direct access to the target’s assets, the acquirer may push 
through a merger with the target after the acquirer has obtained a majority of 
the target’s outstanding voting stock, thereby ending up with the same end 
result as if the corporations had merged to start with. See id. at 1014 (“The 
purchaser can then either run the target as a subsidiary, or liquidate it, thereby 
achieving the same result as a merger.”). A party might also seek control over a 
corporation by persuading other shareholders to elect one and one’s allies to the 
board (a proxy contest in a public corporation). See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A 
Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1071, 1075 (1990) (describing such contests as an alternative to hostile 
takeovers for replacing management). This may achieve control, but not the 
economic benefits of ownership, and so is not functionally equivalent to the 
three primary modes of corporate acquisitions. 
 20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2011) (requiring the board to 
adopt a resolution approving the merger); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(a) 
(1984) (“The plan of merger or share exchange must be adopted by the board of 
directors.”). 
 21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (stating that directors may sell 
substantially all assets upon terms the directors decide, subject to approval by 
the shareholders); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(b) (same). 
 22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271(a) (requiring that a 
proposed merger or sale of the company’s assets must be approved by a 
shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(b), 12.02(a) (same). 
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can seek to purchase most or all of the target corporation’s 
outstanding shares directly from the target’s existing 
stockholders without any approval from—and, indeed, over the 
opposition of—the target’s board of directors.23  Normally, such a 
purchase takes place through a tender offer.24 
Boards of target companies and their advisors have 
developed a variety of strategies for reasserting the board’s 
gatekeeping function even when dealing with a tender offer.25 
These strategies—probably the most effective and common of 
which is the so-called ‘‘poison pill’’26—work by creating various 
                                                                                                     
 23. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 95 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (“[U]nder [Delaware statutory law], board approval and 
recommendation is required before stockholders have the opportunity to vote on 
or even consider a merger proposal, while traditionally the board has been given 
no statutory role in responding to a public tender offer.”). 
 24. The acquirer might seek to buy shares through open market purchases 
as individual stockholders decide to sell their shares through the stock 
exchange. Waiting around for stockholders to call their brokers and sell through 
the stock exchange, however, tends not to be a very efficient way of obtaining a 
majority of the outstanding shares. 
 25. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 192–208 
(2d ed. 2009) (describing these strategies).  
 26. Over the years, the poison pill has mutated (like a virus) and now 
comes in a variety of forms. See id. at 196–202 (describing the evolution of the 
poison pill). Essentially, the poison pill consists of certain rights that attach to 
various types of securities (such as preferred stock, warrants to purchase 
preferred stock, or convertible debt instruments). See id. at 196 (“Poison pills 
take a wide variety of forms, but today most are based on the class of security 
known as a right.”). The corporation can issue these securities as an in-kind 
dividend to its shareholders. See id. (noting that the first poison pill was issued 
to shareholders as a special dividend). In fact, the securities typically possess 
little rights to control or distribution of income and, except in the hostile 
takeover context, are largely worthless. See id. at 197 (noting that poison pill 
rights are typically “priced so that exercise of the option would be economically 
irrational”). Instead, their key feature is the existence of one or more rights that 
trigger upon an acquirer purchasing a certain percentage of the target 
corporation’s outstanding shares. See id. at 196–97 (describing how the exercise 
of these rights act to make the acquisition of the target corporation less 
attractive). These rights, which are commonly referred to as “flip-over” and ‘‘flip-
in’’ provisions, are the poison in the poison pill. See id. at 197, 199 (explaining 
how flip-over and flip-in provisions operate). In the event an acquirer purchases 
the triggering percentage of shares in the target, such provisions may allow the 
holder of the security to purchase the acquirer’s common stock at a substantial 
discount if the acquirer merges with the target, or to purchase stock or other 
securities of the target at a substantial discount—either of which is very 
undesirable from the standpoint of an acquirer. See id. at 197 (explaining how 
activation of the poison pill would deter an acquisition). In addition to the poison 
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barriers that deter a hostile tender offer. Commonly, cooperation 
by the target’s pre-tender offer board can effectively disarm a 
poison pill or other takeover defense. In this manner, such 
takeover defenses reinsert the target’s board into a gatekeeping 
role. 
2. Delaware’s Doctrinal Response 
a. Framing the Issues 
In deciding how to respond to defenses against hostile tender 
offers, the Delaware courts faced two fundamental questions: 
(1) is the limit on takeover defenses one of directors’ authority or 
of their duty; and (2) if the limit is duty, by what standard does 
the court review whether directors breached their duty. 
The first question frames the issue as one of the relative 
power of directors and shareholders and asks whether instituting 
defenses to hostile tender offers exceeds the directors’ authority. 
Prior to Unocal, a number of leading academics argued that 
courts should hold that directors lack authority to institute 
defenses against hostile tender offers.27 A simplistic argument for 
this position would be that the corporation statute empowers the 
board to manage the corporation28—something shareholders in a 
public corporation cannot do for themselves—not to take actions 
that simply interfere with the ability of shareholders to sell their 
own stock. A broader policy oriented argument involves the 
utility of hostile tender offers. Although the gap in the board’s 
gatekeeping role regarding mergers and acquisitions is the result 
of an evolutionary accident rather than the product of an 
                                                                                                     
pill rights, the poison pill security typically is subject to an important 
redemption provision. This provision empowers the board of the target to 
redeem the security at a modest price prior to the triggering event. See id. at 
199–200 (discussing when the board may want to redeem the poison pill 
security). 
 27. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of 
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 
1164 (1981) (“[C]urrent legal rules allowing the target’s management to engage 
in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders’ 
welfare.”). 
 28. See supra note 11 (citing statutes that grant directors the power to 
manage the corporation).  
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intelligent design,29 evolutionary accidents often produce 
advantages. In this instance, many academics have argued that 
hostile tender offers play a useful role in ensuring that corporate 
boards act in the best interest of the corporation and its 
shareholders by creating a practical mechanism for replacing 
incompetent or disloyal boards.30 Given this role for hostile tender 
                                                                                                     
 29. The ability of shareholders to freely transfer their stock has been a 
feature of corporate law ever since the organizers of the Dutch United East 
India Company invented this as a solution to the liquidity demands of investors 
who were tired of waiting for the end of multi-year voyages in order to see any 
money. See, e.g., Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a 
Cooperation-Enhancing Organization 31–32 (Tel Aviv Univ., Working Paper, 
Dec. 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874406 
(describing the invention of transferable shares). At the same time, these 
earliest business corporations were inheriting from merchant guilds and other 
institutions the norm of governance by an elected board. See, e.g., Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, The Political and Historical Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 115–26 (2004) (explaining how corporations 
adopted the idea of board governance from these institutions). Over time, the 
franchise changed from one shareholder, one vote to voting in proportion to one’s 
shares. Id. at 121. Combining free transferability, an elected board, and voting 
in proportion to stock creates the basis for a single person to purchase a 
majority of voting shares and pick the board without having negotiated with the 
prior board—in other words, to launch a hostile takeover. 
 30. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965) (explaining how takeovers ensure 
managerial efficiency). Under this view, the shareholder franchise, by allowing 
shareholders to vote out incompetent or dishonest directors, exists as 
mechanism for insuring directors make wealth maximizing decisions. See, e.g., 
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 309–11 (1983) (noting that an elected board exists to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders, who have the best incentives for 
efficient decisions but are too numerous to monitor management themselves). 
But see Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 170–72 (arguing that a more historically 
accurate view of the shareholder franchise suggests that its purpose is to bestow 
democratic legitimacy upon those who come to control organizations with 
potentially huge economic power). Freely transferable shares, however, can 
undermine the accountability function of the franchise by encouraging 
dissatisfied shareholders to sell out rather than engage in electoral contests. 
See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 560 
(6th ed. 2004) (describing the causes of rational apathy). The ability of parties to 
purchase a majority of shares and elect a new board restores the accountability 
that is otherwise undermined by the apathy induced by freely transferable 
shares and thus, under this view, returns proper balance to the corporate 
universe. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The 
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–45 
(1981) (arguing that a “market for corporate control” is important in keeping 
management accountable, and that the tender offer is the most effective 
mechanism by which that market operates). 
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offers, the argument concludes, directors should not have the 
authority to block such offers and thereby stand in the way of their 
removal.31 Other writers have argued that the superior evolutionary 
development is the centralization of power in the corporate board—
manifested here by the board’s statutory gatekeeping role in 
mergers and asset sales.32 The argument for this view is that the 
board has an inherent advantage over scattered shareholders, who 
face collective action problems, when dealing with a sale of the 
entire company.33 Accordingly, this view concludes that directors 
should have the authority to use defensive tactics in order to claim a 
gatekeeping role even over tender offers.34 
Assuming the board possesses the authority to engage in 
takeover defenses, the question then becomes what sort of standard 
courts will apply when reviewing whether the directors breached 
their duty to advance the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders in undertaking such defenses in a particular case. 
Normally, courts apply the business judgment rule when dealing 
with challenges by disgruntled shareholders to decisions by 
corporate boards.35 While disagreement and doubt exists as to what 
exact standard the business judgment rule entails,36 there is general 
agreement that the standard calls for a greater level of deference to 
directors than to persons in other contexts.37 Hence, few courts in 
applying the business judgment rule would hold directors liable for 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 845–47 (arguing that defensive tactics 
against tender offers reduces the offers’ effectiveness as a means to control 
management discretion). 
 32. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at 57 (arguing that the board, 
rather than shareholders, is in the best position to make decisions regarding a 
merger). 
 33. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 
BUS. LAW. 101, 113–14 (1979) (discussing why shareholders will accept tender 
offers even when not in their interest). 
 34. See id. at 115 (“There is no reason to remove the decision on a takeover 
from the reasonable business judgment of the directors.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (applying the 
business judgment rule). 
 36. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless 
Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 289–303 (1994) 
(discussing different interpretations of the rule). 
 37. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (comparing the 
standard of care for corporate directors to that of a negligent automobile driver). 
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their decision simply because the decision was unreasonable.38 
Delaware courts have equated the standard under the business 
judgment rule with gross negligence.39 The principal exception to 
application of the business judgment rule to a decision by the board 
occurs when the decision involves a conflict of interest for some or 
all board members or parties controlling board members.40 In this 
event, unless shareholders or directors without a conflict vote to 
approve the transaction after full disclosure, courts apply a fairness 
test (called in Delaware the “intrinsic fairness” test).41 Under this 
test, proponents of the transaction must prove to a skeptical court 
that the transaction was fair42—essentially that the corporation 
received as good a deal as it would have if dealing with a stranger.43 
This bifurcated approach reflects a policy that the degree of judicial 
scrutiny over board decisions should depend upon the extent that 
one can trust the directors to act for the right motives (even if not 
always with the best results).44 
The standard that courts should apply to takeover defenses is 
not obvious. While some takeover defenses (such as a golden 
parachute45 or supporting a management buyout46 when either 
                                                                                                     
 38. See id. (“[L]iability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or 
officers simply for bad judgment . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) 
(noting that the business judgment rule applies a standard of gross negligence). 
 40. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) 
(applying a different standard in the case of alleged self-dealing). 
 41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2011) (providing the fairness 
test as an alternative to non-interested director or shareholder approval). 
 42. See, e.g., Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719–20 (“The standard of intrinsic 
fairness involves both a high degree of fairness and a shift in the burden of 
proof.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 225 (Del. 1976) (finding 
that intrinsic fairness test was satisfied because the transaction would have 
been carried out by another corporation in the subject corporation’s position). 
 44. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 341–42 (2d ed. 2010) 
(explaining that the business judgment rule should only apply in instances 
where directors can be trusted to act in the company’s best interest, which is not 
the case in conflict-of-interest transactions). 
 45. In a golden parachute, senior executives, some of whom may be on the 
board, receive compensation from the corporation if terminated following a 
takeover. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at 25 (defining “golden 
parachute”). 
 46. In a management buyout, an entity owned at least in part by senior 
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includes members of the board) constitute traditional conflict-of-
interest transactions between the corporation and its directors, 
most takeover defensives, such as a poison pill, do not.47 On the 
other hand, a takeover presumably will result in the replacement 
of the current directors, which is something that most directors 
have both a financial and a psychological interest to avoid. Hence, 
in opposing a hostile takeover, directors have what one might call 
a positional conflict of interest (the interest in retaining their 
positions even at the shareholders’ expense).48 Still, all sorts of 
decisions, at least indirectly, impact the directors’ retention of 
control over the corporation.49 Hence, courts may understandably 
be reluctant to apply the rigorous scrutiny of fairness review to 
board decisions simply because the decisions impact the directors’ 
continued control. 
b. Unocal 
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,50 the Delaware 
Supreme Court answered these two fundamental questions about 
defenses to hostile tender offers, thereby establishing the law of 
takeover defenses for most of the largest companies in the United 
States.51 Unocal arose out of a hostile tender offer made by Mesa 
Petroleum, a company controlled by corporate raider T. Boone 
Pickens, for Unocal.52 The case presented a particularly 
                                                                                                     
executives, some of whom may be on the board, purchases the corporation. See 
id. (defining “management buyout”). 
 47. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957–58 
(Del. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the directors, in responding to a hostile 
tender offer by deciding to have their corporation make a competing offer to 
repurchase its own shares, had a conflict of interest because the directors also 
owned shares they could sell back to the corporation). 
 48. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1461, 1472 (1989) (coining the term). 
 49. For example, producing good corporate results will decrease the 
interest of shareholders in replacing the current directors. 
 50. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 51. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State 
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (noting that 
over half of all public companies that incorporate in the United States 
incorporate in Delaware). 
 52. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949 n.1. 
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sympathetic set of facts for board intervention. Mesa had 
undertaken a textbook example of a coercive tender offer. 
Specifically, Mesa offered to buy enough shares in Unocal to give 
Mesa majority ownership of Unocal, while at the same time 
informing Unocal’s shareholders that once Mesa acquired a 
majority of Unocal shares, Mesa would use its control to push 
through a merger in which the remaining Unocal shareholders 
would receive junk (below investment grade) bonds in exchange 
for their stock.53 Under these circumstances, Unocal shareholders 
who did not find Mesa’s price attractive might nevertheless 
accept its offer for fear of being left in the minority group who 
only received junk bonds, an example of the “prisoners’ dilemma” 
at work.54 In response, Unocal’s board adopted a resolution 
stating that Unocal would purchase the minority shares not sold 
to Mesa at a price considerably higher than Mesa offered.55 
Funding this repurchase would leave Unocal heavily in debt and 
a much less desirable acquisition for Mesa, who sued to challenge 
the action.56 
Looking first at the question of authority, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Unocal confirmed that directors have the 
power to engage in defenses to hostile tender offers.57 By doing so, 
the court framed Delaware takeover jurisprudence as not about 
whether directors have usurped power belonging to the 
shareholders, but rather as about whether directors, in the 
exercise of their unquestioned power, have breached their 
fiduciary duty to advance the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders. A decade later, the Delaware Supreme Court 
developed second thoughts about this duty, not power, 
framework—at least in extreme cases in which directors have 
deployed defenses that preclude any possibility of a hostile 
acquisition.58 The result, for better or for worse, is to create a sort 
                                                                                                     
 53. See id. at 949–50. 
 54. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 30, at 859–61 (explaining the prisoners’ 
dilemma in tender offers). 
 55. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949–51. 
 56. Id. at 950. 
 57. See id. at 953–54 (explaining that the board can engage in tender offer 
defenses, “provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose 
to entrench themselves in office.”). 
 58. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995) 
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of schizophrenic quality in Delaware takeover jurisprudence; but 
this reframing of the issue in takeovers to reintroduce concerns 
over power, not just duty, post-dates Revlon and so has limited 
impact upon our story. 
Having decided that the issue is fiduciary duty, not power, 
the Unocal court then needed to address the standard it would 
apply in reviewing whether the directors breached their duty 
through the self-tender. To deal with the positional conflict of 
interest confronting directors faced with a hostile tender offer, 
the court in Unocal decided to establish an intermediate level of 
scrutiny between the intrinsic fairness test and the business 
judgment rule. Specifically, the court set out a two-part test to 
review directors’ decisions to employ takeover defenses.59 Under 
the first part of the Unocal test, the directors must prove that 
they possessed reasonable grounds for believing a threat to 
corporate policy and effectiveness existed.60 The second part of 
the test requires that the defensive measure used be reasonable 
in relation to the threat posed.61 This sort of reasonableness test 
                                                                                                     
(explaining that defenses which are coercive or preclusive in cramming down 
upon the shareholders a board sponsored alternative or precluding any hostile 
tender offer violate Unocal’s requirement that defenses be proportionate). 
 59. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) 
(establishing the test). 
 60. See id. at 955 (“[D]irectors must show that they had reasonable grounds 
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because 
of another person’s stock ownership.”). 
 61. See id. (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the 
business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). 
The court was on solid ground in finding Mesa’s coercive tender offer provided 
Unocal’s directors with reasonable grounds for taking action. The court was 
sloppier in finding Unocal’s self-tender was proportionate to the threat. The 
problem was that the self-tender was at a significantly higher price than Mesa’s 
tender offer. As a result, the impact went well beyond removing the prisoners’ 
dilemma (which matching Mesa’s price would have achieved) and created a 
reverse incentive to not tender to Mesa and hold out for the higher price from 
Unocal. Mesa could have responded by matching or exceeding Unocal’s price—
which would have restored the incentive for Unocal’s shareholders to tender to 
Mesa—but the court never asked whether Unocal’s offer was a realistic price 
that Unocal’s directors might have hoped to obtain from Mesa or so out of the 
ballpark that the directors were simply trying to chase Mesa away. In fact, the 
directors seem to have set the self-tender price well above the price that 
Unocal’s investment bankers identified as what the shareholders should get 
from a sale of 100% of the company’s stock. See id. at 950 (“[Banker] opined that 
the minimum cash value that could be expected from a sale or orderly 
liquidation for 100% of Unocal’s stock was in excess of $60 per share [compared 
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as to both ends sought and means used is more demanding than 
the business judgment rule (absence of gross negligence) but is 
not as demanding as the intrinsic fairness test (convincing the 
court that the corporation got a good deal). 
B. Shotgun Corporate Marriages 
1. Circumventing Shareholder Consent to Mergers and Sales of 
Corporations 
The three primary modes of corporate acquisition all 
seemingly require consent of the target company’s shareholders. 
Corporation statutes, including Delaware’s, require a vote of 
approval by a corporation’s shareholders for a sale of 
substantially all of the company’s assets62 and, with limited 
exceptions, for a merger of the corporation.63 While corporation 
statutes, including Delaware’s, do not require a formal vote by 
shareholders to accept a tender offer, shareholders “vote with 
their feet” insofar as the failure of enough shareholders to sell 
renders the tender offer unsuccessful.64 Yet, just as the tender 
offer allows buyers and shareholders to circumvent the board’s 
gatekeeping role with respect to corporate mergers and sales, 
techniques exist that allow the board to circumvent the 
shareholders’ veto over mergers and sales. 
a. Avoiding Consent Requirements 
Corporate laws contain various gaps in their requirement for 
shareholder consent to corporate combinations and sales. 
Directors can exploit these gaps to avoid putting a corporate 
combination or sale to a shareholder vote.  
                                                                                                     
to $72 per share offered by Unocal’s board].”). 
 62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2011) (requiring that any such 
sale be authorized by a resolution adopted by shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (1984) (same). 
 63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (requiring that a proposed 
merger agreement be submitted to a shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 11.04(b) (same). 
 64. GEVURTZ, supra note 16, at 1015. 
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To begin with, corporation statutes, including Delaware’s, 
typically do not require a vote by the shareholders of the 
acquiring corporation either to purchase substantially all of the 
assets of another corporation or to make a tender offer for 
another corporation’s outstanding shares.65 At first glance, this 
seems irrelevant to the requirement of shareholder approval in 
order to sell the shareholders’ corporation. The problem, however, 
is that the acquiring corporation in a sale of assets or tender offer 
does not, in fact, need to be the company that is the buyer as one 
normally thinks of who is buying whom. Specifically, the 
corporation whose owners end up acquiring a majority of the 
stock in the company emerging from the transaction—in other 
words, the party one would normally think of as the purchaser—
could actually be the company selling all of its of assets or whose 
owners sell their stock. This happens if the company purchasing 
all of another company’s assets or purchasing another company’s 
outstanding stock pays by issuing shares sufficient to give the 
shareholders on the so-called seller’s side a majority ownership of 
the so-called purchasing company.66 For evident reason this is 
known as an upside-down transaction. 
Triangular transactions also allow planners to avoid 
requirements for a shareholder vote. In a triangular merger, a 
subsidiary engages in the merger. In this instance, the 
shareholder that must approve the merger is the parent company 
of the merging subsidiary.67 This means that the decision lies 
with the parent corporation’s board, which will decide how the 
parent votes the shares it owns in the subsidiary, rather than the 
shareholders of the parent. This can be true even though the 
parent might issue sufficient stock in itself to give the other side’s 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 1013, 1014 (noting the lack of shareholder voting rights in 
these instances). 
 66. For example, in Farris v. Glen-Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958), the 
corporation purchasing all the assets of the so-called selling corporation paid by 
issuing over three and a half million shares at a time when it had less two and a 
half million shares outstanding, with the result that, after the corporation 
which sold its assets dissolved and distributed the shares it received in the sale 
to its stockholders, the former stockholders of the so-called selling corporation 
ended up with most of the shares in the so-called buyer. See id. at 27 (describing 
the assets-for-shares exchange). 
 67. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 16, at 1021 (explaining the mechanics of 
a triangular merger).  
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shareholder(s) control over the emerging combination, again 
depriving the shareholders on what one would normally view to 
be the seller’s side of any vote.68 
Triangular transactions, asset sales, and tender offers also 
can deprive at least one side’s shareholders of a vote on a so-
called merger of equals. The basic scheme of corporate law not 
only views the target corporation’s shareholders as entitled to 
vote on an acquisition of their company but also views both sides’ 
shareholders as entitled to vote on a marriage between two 
operating companies in which the combination significantly 
impacts the shareholders in both companies.69 Parties, however, 
can structure such a merger of equals as a triangular merger, 
sale of assets, or purchase of stock, thereby depriving one side’s 
shareholders of a vote on the transaction.70 
One caveat to this discussion is that issuing additional 
shares in upside-down and triangular transactions might demand 
a shareholder vote. If the certificate of incorporation did not 
authorize the company to issue the number of shares called for by 
the deal, shareholders would need to vote to amend the 
certificate.71 Stock exchange rules also require listed companies 
to put large issuances of stock to a shareholder vote.72 On the 
                                                                                                     
 68. As discussed infra in notes 144–52 and the accompanying text, the 
original structure for the famous Time–Warner merger involved a merger of 
Warner with a Time subsidiary in which Time would have issued enough shares 
to the former Warner shareholders to give the former Warner shareholders a 
majority of Time’s outstanding shares after the merger. Nevertheless, the 
merger provision in Delaware’s corporation statute did not require Time’s 
shareholders to approve this proposed merger. 
 69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), (f) (2011) (requiring 
shareholder approval for both corporations in a merger but noting that 
shareholders do not need to approve a merger that does not significantly change 
their rights by amending the certificate, exchanging their shares, or issuing a 
significant amount of additional shares). 
 70. See, e.g., Farris, 143 A.2d at 27 (noting that the sale of assets involved a 
major change in the rights of shareholders of the purchasing corporation). 
 71. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (“The holders of the 
outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed 
amendment . . . if the amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate 
number of shares of such class . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (1984) 
(requiring that any amendment to the articles of incorporation be approved by 
the shareholders). 
 72. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2013), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%
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other hand, if the certificate of incorporation provides for a large 
number of authorized but not yet issued shares and if a 
corporation is content to delist its stock, then these requirements 
for a shareholder vote do not come into play. 
b. Coercing Consent 
In lieu of avoiding a shareholder vote, directors may employ 
tactics to pressure the shareholders into voting in favor of a board 
supported sale or combination. To the extent that directors can 
chase away other bidders for the company through takeover 
defenses, the directors can push the shareholders to vote in favor 
of the board supported transaction as the only choice presented. 
Moreover, to the extent that directors agree to terms that will 
cause detrimental effects upon the corporation if its shareholders 
vote the sale or combination down, the directors can discourage 
shareholders from voting in favor of continuing the status quo. 
Various deal protection devices, such as termination fees and 
lock-up agreements, can pressure shareholders to vote for a board 
favored combination both by removing other choices and by 
penalizing the shareholders for voting a deal down.73 A 
termination fee paid to the favored merger partner if the 
shareholders vote down the board proposed merger provides the 
simplest illustration. A termination fee large enough that its 
payment would impact negatively the value of the corporation 
makes the corporation no longer as attractive a target to other 
bidders. It also penalizes the shareholders by making their 
corporation less valuable if they vote down the deal. A lock-up 
under which the board agrees to sell desirable assets of the 
corporation (the crown jewels) cheaply to the favored bidder in 
the event the shareholders vote down the board proposed 
combination has the same two impacts but typically with far 
greater magnitude. Although they do not decrease the value of 
                                                                                                     
5F1%5F4%5F11%5F1&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (explaining where shareholder approval is necessary 
for stock distribution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and 
Lock-ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 287–88 
(1990) (analyzing the impact of asset and stock lock-up agreements). 
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the target corporation, lock-up agreements under which the board 
will sell stock cheaply to the favored bidder dilute the value of the 
remaining shares if the favored combination does not occur. Once 
again, the impact is to discourage competing bids or a negative 
vote.74 The larger the termination fee or lock-up, the greater the 
impact. Eventually the impact reaches a point at which no other 
bidder may come forward and rational shareholders would vote 
for a deal they would otherwise reject simply in order to avoid the 
penalty. 
2. Delaware’s Doctrinal Response 
The policy issues raised by shotgun corporate marriages are 
complex—perhaps more so than the issues raised by takeover 
defenses—and, as a result, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
response is something of a muddle. While a full exploration of 
this topic must await another article, an overview of these issues 
and the Delaware Supreme Court’s response is necessary to 
understand Revlon because Revlon sits in the middle of this 
muddle. 
a. Framing the Issues 
As with defenses to hostile tender offers, attempts to avoid or 
coerce shareholder consent force courts to decide whether the 
issue is authority (have directors exceeded their authority in 
acting without a vote by shareholders who were not subject to 
coercion?) or duty (have directors’ breached their duty to advance 
the interests of the shareholders and the corporation?); and, if the 
issue is duty, by what standard does the court review whether 
directors breached their duty? Complicating the answers here, 
however, is the lack of any consensus on what purpose 
shareholder consent serves, as well as the fact that deal 
                                                                                                     
 74. Selling stock cheaply to the favored buyer before the shareholders act 
on the proposed transaction (as opposed to simply giving the favored buyer the 
option to purchase stock cheaply if the shareholders reject the deal) also gives 
the favored buyer a leg-up on gaining favorable shareholder action. 
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protection devices may have other impacts besides coercing 
shareholder consent. 
The requirement for shareholder consent to mergers and 
sales of assets is again a product of evolution, in this instance 
from an era in which corporate laws applied partnership and 
contract based ideas that called for the consent of all partners or 
parties to the contract to any alternations of the basic deal.75 
Pressure to remove barriers to corporate mergers and 
acquisitions led to eliminating the requirement that all 
shareholders consent and replacing it with supermajority and 
eventually majority vote requirements76 but without an evident 
rethinking of why the law required any shareholder vote at all. 
Scholars have asserted various rationales for the continuing 
viability of requiring a shareholder vote to approve mergers and 
sales of substantially all assets. Melvin Eisenberg argues that it 
reflects a difference in expertise between directors and 
shareholders.77 Directors have an advantage in expertise when it 
comes to business decisions (e.g., build a plant, discontinue a 
product line). Shareholders, however, have as much expertise as 
directors when it comes to broad investment decisions—they buy 
and sell stock in their company. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel argue that it reflects the importance of the decision 
involved. Their notion is that shareholders will not pay much 
attention to ordinary corporate decisions but will give thoughtful 
consideration to critical decisions such as whether to merge.78 By 
                                                                                                     
 75. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting 
Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1992) (describing the contractual theory of 
shareholder consent). 
 76. See id. at 10 (noting that the unanimous consent requirement created 
an obstacle to corporate expansion and acquisitions). To substitute for 
unanimous consent, corporate laws established appraisal rights allowing 
dissenting shareholders to cash out. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The 
Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 
228–29 (1962) (explaining how appraisal rights provided an alternative to the 
unanimous consent rule). 
 77. MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 14–16 (1976) 
(creating a distinction between decisions that directors are more qualified to 
make and those that are more suitable for shareholders). 
 78. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate 
Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 416 (1983) (“[T]he possibility of large gain or loss in 
these transactions because of their size is sufficient to overcome the collective 
action problems . . . that would make voting on ordinary business decisions 
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contrast, Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black suggest that it is a 
response to the poor incentives directors may have in a final 
period situation.79 Specifically, because directors will presumably 
lose their positions following a sale of substantially all assets and 
potentially lose their positions following a merger, directors lose 
their incentive to avoid actions prejudicial to the shareholders in 
making these decisions.80 The requirement of shareholder 
approval allows the shareholders to protect themselves from 
damaging board decisions that may result. 
The absence of a consensus on the purpose that shareholder 
consent serves—and therefore whether it should exist—makes it 
difficult to resolve the power question of when courts should find 
that directors impermissibly avoided shareholder consent by 
virtue of the manner in which the directors structured the 
transaction. Complicating this issue further, courts must ask 
whether they should leave this issue to the legislature, which 
created the discontinuity in shareholder approval requirements 
to begin with. 
Deal protection devices, such as lock-ups, raise yet another 
policy concern. Although they constrain shareholder voice by 
reducing alternatives and potentially penalizing the corporation 
if the shareholders vote down the transaction, proponents argue 
that lock-ups also may be the necessary price to attract either an 
initial or a topping bid.81 In other words, prospective buyers may 
not wish to invest the time and energy bidding on a company 
without some consolation prize should their deal not go through. 
Actually, however, it is misleading to suggest that the board must 
                                                                                                     
meaningless.”). 
 79. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 720–21 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that directors have 
less incentive to avoid harmful actions in “final period” transactions because 
they cannot be penalized in subsequent transactions). 
 80. See id. (“In the context of an acquisition nothing stops target 
management from selling out the shareholders in return for side payments from 
the acquiring company because target management, by definition, will no longer 
be subject to the constraints of the product, capital and control markets after 
the acquisition.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Barbara A. Koza, Note, Corporations—Mergers—“Lock-Up” 
Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act—Mobil Corp. v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 892 
(1982) (stating that lock-up agreements further the interests of shareholders by 
ensuring more beneficial “white knight” mergers). 
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provide substantial consideration just to get a bid. As illustrated 
by the facts in Revlon itself, proposed lock-ups come as part of a 
package with a bid.82 Indeed, a board would be crazy (and lose the 
protection of the business judgment rule83) if it were to agree to a 
lock-up imposing substantial potential cost on the corporation 
without knowing what the bid is. Hence, the costs incurred by the 
bidder in preparing the bid are sunk costs and gone if the board 
rejects the bid (with the lock-up).84 
In fact, lock-ups, for the most part, only exist because 
corporate law limits the board’s authority to merge or sell the 
company without shareholder approval. This is not to say that 
lock-ups are always, or even normally, efforts to coerce 
shareholder acceptance of the transaction approved by the board. 
Rather, it is to say that there generally would be no need for a 
lock-up if the board had the authority to enter a binding contract 
to merge or sell the corporation without shareholder approval. 
After all, if the board had such authority, then the bidder could 
have a binding contract to merge or buy the company, and not 
just some assets or stock, in order to ensure that the bidder gets 
something for its efforts.85 The fact that lock-ups exist because of 
                                                                                                     
 82. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of 
Revlon). 
 83. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 887–88 (Del. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) 
(holding directors breached their duty of care in voting without sufficient 
information for a merger agreement which sold the company). 
 84. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking 
Lockups, 103 YALE. L.J. 1739, 1814 (1994) (“[B]y the time a bidder makes its bid 
and the target board considers whether to grant a lockup in exchange, most of 
the costs are already sunk.”). 
 85. In some cases, antitrust or regulatory barriers might prevent 
completion of a merger or sale, albeit this seems to be a declining risk in the 
current antitrust era. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 544, 608 (4th ed. 2011) 
(noting that today’s antitrust enforcers and courts view mergers as less of a 
competitive threat than they did in the past). Still, it is not clear why the risk of 
uncompensated costs in events that are beyond the target corporation’s control 
should fall entirely on the target rather than on both sides. Beyond regulatory 
barriers, there remains the danger that the board might have the corporation 
breach the contract to merge or sell the company if a better bid comes along. For 
this reason, a contract might provide liquidated damages, and a cash 
termination fee might serve the same function. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 
73, at 245–46 (explaining the use of these provisions). On the other hand, a lock-
up option to sell assets or stock is still a contract, and the board might always 
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the limitation on the board’s authority to sell the company 
without shareholder approval, in turn, raises the question of 
whether the lock-up, itself, should be viewed as beyond the 
board’s authority. Put in terms of a simple principal/agent model, 
would a principal, who demands that an agent check back with 
the principal before entering a contract, wish to give the agent 
authority to pay the third party something if it turns out that the 
principal decides that the agent brought back a poor offer? 
Indeed, is a third party who would demand such a fee not 
signaling to the principal a lack of confidence in the offer 
presented to the agent? 
One difference, however, with shareholder approval from this 
simple principal/agent model is the time delay entailed in 
obtaining a shareholder vote in a public corporation. This might 
suggest a rationale for lock-ups as the consideration for 
shareholders obtaining a several month long option contract.86 If 
the rationale for lock-ups is to provide an option contract for 
shareholders, then presumably the lock-up should not be so large 
as to destroy the value of the option. In other words, if the lock-up 
is large enough to chase away any higher bidders and pressure 
shareholders into voting for the transaction simply to avoid 
triggering the lock-up, then the lock-up gains nothing of value by 
buying time for the shareholders. Some scholars have attempted 
to construct tests that would identify lock-ups having such 
foreclosing impact.87 Whether these tests, in fact, differentiate 
good and bad lock-ups and whether adequate information exists 
in the real world to execute these tests are open questions.88  
                                                                                                     
breach the lock-up contract if a better bid comes along. This would still leave 
litigation necessary to figure out expectation damages. Hence, asset or stock 
lock-ups are not equivalent to liquidated damages. 
 86. See, e.g., Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
July 6, 1982) (describing the lock-up as compensation to the bidder for 
essentially providing a put option). 
 87. See Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 323–32 (proposing bright-line cutoff 
at 10% of the transaction value); Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do 
Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 682, 704–09 (1990) (suggesting an approach that compares whether the 
bidder would profit more from a takeover or from tendering treasury shares to 
another bidder). 
 88. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 84, at 1768–69, 1774–84 (calling 
Ayres and Bainbridge’s proposals into question). 
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Turning from power to duty, courts must once again decide 
what standard they will employ in reviewing a particular board 
decision to see if the board breached its duty to advance the 
interest of the corporation and the shareholders. This turns out to 
be even more complicated in shotgun corporate marriages than 
when dealing with tender offer defenses. For one thing, it is less 
clear how circumventing shareholder consent fits within the 
traditional rubric under which the degree of judicial scrutiny 
depends upon whether one can trust directors to act for proper 
motives. In the context of takeover defenses, the concern raised 
by the directors’ positional conflict of interest fits nicely into this 
rubric—even if the positional conflict may call for greater nuance 
than the traditional bifurcated approach of extreme deference or 
extreme scrutiny. By contrast, the existence of self-interest is less 
apparent if all that is going on is that the directors are 
determined to have their way and not allow the shareholders to 
block a merger or sale which the directors view to be in the best 
interests of the company or the shareholders. 
As the events in Revlon itself illustrate, however, this 
conclusion becomes confused because of the overlap between 
takeover defenses and shotgun corporate marriages. The takeover 
defenses discussed earlier deter and stall hostile tender offers but 
might not be able to prevent the acquisition of a widely held 
corporation over the board’s objection no matter how determined 
and patient the acquirer.89 Hence, the only way to prevent the 
acquisition of a highly attractive target corporation by an 
undesired (from the standpoint of the target’s board) suitor might 
be to find another buyer (a so-called white knight).90 Of course, it 
is not enough simply to locate a white knight; the target’s board 
must both entice the white knight to enter the fray and ensure 
the white knight prevails in the contest. Agreeing to lock-ups or 
other deal protection devices for the white knight potentially 
                                                                                                     
 89. For example, to deal with a poison pill, an acquirer may launch a proxy 
contest coupled with a hostile tender offer conditioned on the board’s redeeming 
the pill. The idea is to persuade the existing shareholders to vote in directors 
friendly to the acquirer. These new directors will redeem the pill before the 
acquirer purchases the number of shares otherwise triggering the poison. See, 
e.g., CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 30, at 990 (describing this strategy). 
 90. See id. at 993 (explaining that if the target’s management fails in its 
efforts to defend against a hostile bid, its second best strategy may be an 
acquisition by a less threatening bidder—a so-called white knight).  
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accomplishes both goals. Yet, corporate combinations occur all the 
time without the prompting of a hostile tender offer.91 In this 
situation, a significant threat to obtaining shareholder approval 
is a better offer from another bidder.92 Hence, tactics, including 
lock-ups and other deal protection devices, that deter competing 
offers are a major means for assuring shareholder approval of 
board favored combinations.93 The end result is to create a 
twilight zone in which a board may take the same actions either 
to push through a corporate combination in order to defeat an 
undesired tender offer or to deter competing tender offers in order 
to push through a desired corporate combination. Put in more 
colorful language, shotgun corporate marriages can be a defense 
to a hostile tender offer, while defenses to a hostile tender offer 
can be the shotgun used to force the shareholders to accept a 
board desired corporate marriage. 
When the board seeks to avoid or coerce shareholder consent 
in favor of a white knight brought in as a response to a hostile 
tender offer, the positional conflict of interest created by the 
pending hostile tender offer seems evident enough—albeit, as 
discussed later,94 the positional conflict actually may be less in 
the white knight situation than with takeover defenses that 
would leave the target independent. The same positional conflict 
may exist even if the board searches for a white knight when the 
board views the corporation as likely in the near future to attract 
a hostile bid, albeit prior to facing the threat from an identifiable 
hostile bidder. On the other hand, suppose a board seeks a 
combination or sale in the situation in which the board did not 
feel there was any particular danger of a hostile tender offer if 
the board did not act. In such a situation, where is the positional 
conflict? True, the board may employ deal protection devices to 
prevent competing bids, which action sounds like it fits in the 
tender offer defense world. Yet, in this instance, the motive for 
deterring such offers is not to maintain the current directors’ 
positions but rather to get the board’s way on the transaction. 
                                                                                                     
 91. See id. at 992 (noting that most corporate acquisitions are friendly). 
 92. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 240–42 (naming potential 
obstacles to consummating friendly mergers). 
 93. See id. at 250 (describing how lock-ups deter competing bids). 
 94. See infra notes 343–46 and accompanying text (comparing the conflicts 
of interest in a white knight situation and a typical takeover defense). 
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Does the mere desire to have one’s way regarding a specific 
business decision constitute a conflict of interest? If so, the 
implications reach far beyond shotgun corporate marriages.95 
Beyond the question of self-interest, perhaps there is some 
other justification for heightened judicial scrutiny when directors 
avoid or coerce shareholder consent to a corporate merger or sale. 
The argument would be that the traditional rubric, under which 
the degree of judicial scrutiny depends upon the presence or 
absence of director self-interest, is not exclusive. Instead, 
heightened scrutiny also may be necessary to provide a functional 
substitute for shareholder consent that directors avoided or 
coerced. 
In fact, one might find support for this functional substitute 
argument in the structure of statutory provisions, such as Section 
144 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law,96 which deals with 
director conflict-of-interest transactions. Such provisions allow 
either a vote by shareholders or a judicial finding of fairness to 
cure the conflict.97 Hence, heightened judicial scrutiny and 
shareholder consent act as functional substitutes in addressing 
director self-dealing. On the other hand, with director conflict-of-
interest transactions, the law looks for a party one can trust to 
review the transaction because we cannot trust the directors. 
Both the court and disinterested shareholders constitute someone 
we can trust.98 Unless one accepts Professor Gilson’s final period 
incentives argument,99 however, the issue is not one of trust when 
dealing with directors avoiding or coercing shareholder approval 
of mergers and sales. If the issue is not trust, then heightened 
judicial scrutiny may not serve as a functional substitute for 
shareholder consent. For example, if the purpose of shareholder 
                                                                                                     
 95. Cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (describing Eisner’s manipulation of the process in order to get his way on 
hiring Ovitz). 
 96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011). 
 97. See id. § 144(a)(2)–(3) (allowing the conflicted transaction to occur if the 
conflict is disclosed to shareholders who then approve the deal or if the 
transaction is “fair” to the company). 
 98. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 344 (noting that shareholders or 
the court can be trusted more to provide a fair review of conflict-of-interest 
transactions than interested directors). 
 99. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (elaborating on the final 
period argument). 
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consent is to allow the owners control over investment or major 
decisions for what is, after all, their company, heightened judicial 
scrutiny does not provide a functional substitute any more than it 
would if directors simply cancelled the annual election of 
directors and ask the court to review whether the current board 
has done a good job. 
b. The Current Approach 
The Delaware Supreme Court has not shown the same 
concern found in some other states about actions taken by boards 
to avoid putting corporate combinations or sales to a shareholder 
vote. Courts in some jurisdictions have attempted to prevent use 
of upside-down and triangular transactions to avoid triggering 
shareholder rights (such as voting or appraisal rights) that 
normally attach to a merger.100 These courts have done so by 
labeling such a transaction a de facto merger, which, in turn, 
requires the same approval process and calls for the same 
shareholder rights as a normal merger.101 By contrast, the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.102 
rejected any recognition of the de facto merger doctrine when it 
comes to shareholder rights in Delaware.103 Instead, the court 
held that statutory provisions involving mergers and asset sales 
were “of equal dignity,” and if directors employ one to achieve the 
same objective without extending the same rights to shareholders 
as provided by the other it is not up to the court to interfere.104 
Delaware court decisions regarding lock-ups and other deal 
protection devices are more complicated. Interestingly, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has only obliquely addressed the issue 
of whether the statutory requirement that shareholders approve 
                                                                                                     
 100. See, e.g., Pratt v. Ballman-Cummings Furniture Co., 495 S.W.2d 509, 
510–11 (Ark. 1973) (recognizing that a corporate combination, though not a 
merger in fact, may still have the same legal effect as a merger and therefore 
should be treated as such). 
 101. See id. at 510 (noting that a de facto merger confers the same rights on 
shareholders as a true merger). 
 102. 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
 103. See id. at 125 (applying the sale-of-assets statute, even though the sale 
achieved the same result as a merger). 
 104. Id. 
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a merger or sale of assets also limits the board’s authority to 
agree to lock-ups or other deal protection devices without 
shareholder approval. Courts outside of Delaware have disagreed 
on this question.105 While never expressly entering this fray, the 
fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed 
whether directors breached their fiduciary duty in agreeing to 
individual lock-ups and deal protection devices106 suggests that 
this overall authority issue does not bother the court. 
Turning to fiduciary duty and lock-ups brings us to Revlon. 
Prompted in part by Revlon but extending to situations not 
governed by Revlon,107 the Delaware Supreme Court has 
conflated the white knight situation with the situation in which 
directors avoid or coerce shareholder consent in order to push 
through a merger or sale favored by the board prior to any threat 
of a hostile tender offer.108 Hence, lock-ups and deal protection 
devices seem to trigger Unocal even when they do not trigger 
Revlon.109 Unfortunately, the Delaware Supreme Court has made 
a muddle of the rationale for and the implications of triggering 
Unocal in these situations. 
In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,110 the Delaware 
Supreme Court sought to explain the basis for invoking Unocal 
when the directors were not seeking to thwart a hostile tender 
                                                                                                     
 105. Compare ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576, 588 (Neb. 
1986) (stating that the corporation was not bound by an agreement to submit a 
merger to a shareholder vote because there was no binding merger agreement 
before shareholders approved), with Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores 
Nw., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1560 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the board may bind 
the corporation not to enter into competing contracts until the shareholders 
have an opportunity to vote on the proposed merger). 
 106. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 183 (Del. 1986) (“[A] lock-up is not per se illegal under Delaware law.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 
(Del. 1989) (treating the denial of a shareholder vote on a deal agreed to by the 
board before any threat of a hostile tender offer as if it was a takeover defense, 
in a case in which Revlon did not apply).  
 108. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 
46 (Del. 1994) (applying enhanced scrutiny to lock-ups in a deal agreed to before 
the threat of a hostile tender offer). 
 109. See e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930–31 
(Del. 2003) (applying Unocal to deal protection terms in a merger agreement not 
entered in response to a hostile tender offer and not covered by Revlon). 
 110. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
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offer. The court spoke of the “conflicts of interest [that] arise 
when a board acts to prevent the shareholders from effectively 
exercising their right to vote contrary to the will of the board.”111 
In other words, the court appears to be treating the mere desire 
of the board to have its way on a corporate decision requiring 
mutual consent of the board and the shareholders as a conflict of 
interest requiring heightened scrutiny without regard to whether 
the directors have any other self-interest at stake. This concern 
with preserving an effective shareholder franchise in approving 
mergers finds further reflection in the substance of Unocal as 
later refined by the Delaware Supreme Court. Specifically, as 
later interpreted, Unocal bans “coercive” or “preclusive” 
defenses.112 This would seem to provide a basis for invalidating 
lock-ups that coerce shareholders into voting for a board-favored 
deal. Yet, it remains unclear how much the Delaware Supreme 
Court really will protect shareholder voice in corporate mergers. 
Specifically, although the Delaware Supreme Court has stated 
that devices which lead shareholders to vote for a transaction on 
the basis of something other than its merits are coercive,113 the 
court defanged this in the deal protection context by holding that 
termination fees and lock-ups are part of the transaction and so 
the influence of such terms on the shareholder vote does not lead 
the shareholders to vote based upon something other than the 
merits of the deal.114 Further, it is doubtful that the Omnicare 
Court would have invalidated the agreement in that case had the 
directors left themselves an escape clause to take a better deal if 
one came along before the shareholders voted.115 This suggests 
                                                                                                     
 111. Id. at 930. 
 112. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995). 
 113. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 1996) (“Wrongful 
coercion may exist where the board or some other party takes actions which 
have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed 
transaction for some reason other than the merits of that transaction.”). 
 114. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997) (finding that 
termination fee provisions “were an integral part of the merits of the 
transaction”). 
 115. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936–39 (finding that the deal in question did 
not allow directors to uphold their fiduciary duties to minority stockholders). 
Such a “fiduciary out” provision would not only have complied with the portion 
of the court’s opinion explicitly commanding such a term but it also arguably 
would have eliminated the basis for the court’s treating the deal as coercive 
insofar as the merger was preordained to take place (because the board 
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that concerns over shareholder consent may evaporate if the 
court does not think that the directors got an undeniably bad 
deal. This focus on patently inferior deals brings us to Revlon. 
C. Revlon 
Revlon arose out of an effort by a company, Pantry Pride, to 
acquire Revlon. Pantry Pride was a small, highly leveraged 
company that planned to acquire Revlon by using money raised 
through the sale of junk bonds—a debt it would repay by selling 
off Revlon’s divisions.116 After rejecting Pantry Pride’s offer to 
purchase Revlon, Revlon’s board adopted a poison pill plan.117 
When this turned out to be inadequate to deter Pantry Pride from 
launching a cash tender offer for all Revlon shares, Revlon’s 
board responded by having Revlon make a tender offer to 
repurchase a substantial fraction of its own outstanding shares in 
exchange for a combination of convertible preferred stock and, of 
considerable significance to the events that followed, promissory 
notes issued by Revlon.118 Revlon’s offer was hugely over-
subscribed and Revlon purchased on a pro-rata basis from the 
tendering shareholders the number of shares it offered to buy.119 
While this turned the vast majority of Revlon’s shareholders into 
also its creditors, the transaction did not stop Pantry Pride’s 
unwanted advances. After Pantry Pride responded with a higher 
price tender offer, Revlon’s board authorized its management to 
seek other buyers for the company.120 Management’s efforts 
produced a bid from the private equity firm Forstmann Little.121  
The ultimate Forstmann bid, like the Pantry Pride bid, 
involved paying cash for all outstanding Revlon stock financed by 
                                                                                                     
promised to put it to a shareholder vote while the controlling shareholders 
promised to vote for it). Id. 
 116. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
180–81 (Del. 1986). 
 117. Id. at 177.  
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. (stating that Revlon stockholders tendered 87% of the total 
outstanding shares of Revlon (approximately 33 million shares) and the 
company repurchased the 10 million shares it offered to buy on a pro rata basis). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 177–78. 
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debt to be repaid through the sale of Revlon’s divisions.122 
Forstmann’s price was slightly higher than the outstanding 
Pantry Pride offer;123 albeit, Pantry Pride had announced its 
intention to top any competing bid by at least a small margin.124 
Pantry Pride never got the opportunity to do so because Revlon’s 
board agreed to Forstmann’s offer.125 Critically in terms of cutting 
off any further offer by Pantry Pride, the agreement with 
Forstmann contained a lock-up provision requiring Revlon, if 
anyone other than Forstmann acquired 40% of Revlon’s stock, to 
sell a pair of divisions to Forstmann at a price far below the value 
Revlon’s investment banker attributed to them.126 Revlon’s board 
gave three reasons for entering the agreement with Forstmann: 
the higher price (ignoring, of course, Pantry Pride’s announced 
intention to top any bid); firmer financing (which the court found 
not to be the case127); and, critically, that Forstmann had agreed 
to actions to protect the value of the notes Revlon had issued in 
the stock buy-back (many holders of which were threatening to 
sue the board when the noteholders heard that the board would 
support a leveraged buy-out of Revlon).128 
Blocked by the lock-up, Pantry Pride sued. Applying Unocal, 
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld Revlon’s initial defensive 
steps, including adoption of the poison pill.129 The court’s 
approach changed, however, when it reached the challenges to 
the Forstmann agreement with its lock-up provision. Here, the 
court announced a new rule for the situation in which the break-
                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 178. 
 123. The exact amount of the disparity was uncertain because, while the 
Forstmann price was a dollar per share higher than Pantry Pride’s existing 
offer, it would not be paid to the shareholders as soon as the Pantry Pride offer, 
thereby offsetting some of the advantage when one factors in the time value of 
money. Id. at 178 n.6. 
 124. Id. at 178. 
 125. Id. at 178–79. 
 126. Id. at 178. The agreement with Forstmann also contained a 
termination fee and a no-shop provision. Id. 
 127. See id. at 184 (“[A]ny distinctions between the rival bidders’ methods of 
financing the proposal were nominal at best  . . . .”). 
 128. See id. at 178–79 (describing the Revlon board’s reasons for accepting 
Forstmann’s bid). 
 129. See id. at 180–81 (noting that the board acted appropriately in the face 
of an inadequate hostile bid). 
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up of the company is inevitable and the board authorizes efforts 
to sell the company: 
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation 
of Revlon as a corporate  entity to the maximization of the 
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.  This 
significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the 
Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate 
policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests, from 
a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive 
measures became moot. The directors’ role changed from 
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company.130 
From this language grew the notion that Revlon created a 
new regime in takeover contests in which the directors 
abandoned their role as defenders against a corporate takeover 
and now must auction the company to get the highest price for 
the shareholders.131 Finding that Revlon’s directors had breached 
their duty in this regard by cutting off the auction not to get the 
highest price but to favor the bid protecting the noteholders, the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the injunction against carrying 
out the Forstmann agreement.132 
III. Problems in Applying the Revlon Gloss 
The subsequent history of Revlon might stand for the 
proposition that “bad facts make bad law.” More appropriately, it 
stands for the proposition that sometimes courts should quit 
while they are ahead. The decision in Revlon itself was 
reasonable. The problems arose when Delaware courts assumed 
that the case had something to say about situations in which the 
directors were not choosing between two all-cash all-shares bids. 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 182. 
 131. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3280 (treating this passage as 
establishing a situation (“Revlon-land”) in which Unocal is supplanted by a 
narrower obligation). 
 132. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
185 (Del. 1986) (concluding that Revlon’s directors “allowed considerations other 
than the maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment, and 
followed a course that ended the auction for Revlon . . . to the ultimate 
detriment of its shareholders.”). 
1518 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013) 
Specifically, it has been difficult to decide sensibly about which 
other cases Revlon has something relevant to say and to figure 
out what this something is. 
A. What Triggers Revlon? 
A quarter century of efforts by Delaware courts to decide 
when Revlon applies reminds one a bit of the NFL’s experience 
with replacement referees: Decisions often seem unpredictable 
and paradoxical. 
1. The Early Formulations 
Revlon was less than entirely clear on what exactly triggers 
its impact. The court referred to the increase in the hostile 
bidder’s offers from which “it became apparent to all that the 
breakup of the company was inevitable.”133 The court then stated 
that the “board’s authorization permitting management to 
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition 
that the company was for sale.”134 Putting the two sentences 
together, did the court mean that the rule it announced in Revlon 
only became applicable if the board capitulates to seeking a sale, 
or is it sufficient that an objective observer would conclude that 
an acquisition was inevitable despite the board’s opposition? 
Moreover, does any decision to sell the company trigger the rule 
that Revlon announces or only a sale in which the buyer intends 
to break-up the company? Also, what is a sale? For example, does 
this include transactions such as a recapitalization of the 
company through corporate share issuances and repurchases that 
leaves a management group with a controlling block of shares? 
The Delaware Supreme Court seemed to take a narrow and 
formalistic approach to answering such questions in Ivanhoe 
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.135 Ivanhoe involved an 
idiosyncratic situation in which the challenged board action 
consisted of declaring a dividend that financed open market 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 182. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). 
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purchases by the company’s largest shareholder of more stock in 
the company.136 These purchases left this shareholder still 
owning slightly less than half the outstanding stock and the 
shareholder agreed to limit its exercise of control.137 Yet, between 
this party’s holdings and the shares held by management there 
were not enough other shares left outstanding for anyone else to 
purchase control.138 Hence, the end result left the management 
free from the threat of a hostile bidder and entrenched in control. 
Finding that the board did not sell the company—after all, the 
shareholder, aided in its purchases by the board, did not buy the 
whole company or even acquire control over the company, and the 
group who ended up in control did not buy anything—the 
Delaware Supreme Court held Revlon did not apply.139 
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,140 however, the 
Delaware Supreme Court suggested a more expansive view. 
Actually, the facts in MacMillan did not force the court to reach 
situations much beyond Revlon itself. The company was faced 
with two competing all-cash or largely all-cash bids, and the 
board concluded that it would be in the best interest of the 
shareholders to sell the company and initiate a formal auction.141 
Nevertheless, the court sought to minimize the significance of its 
Ivanhoe decision as involving a unique situation in which the 
impact of strengthening management’s position was a secondary 
effect.142 Moreover, the court stated that Revlon applied whether 
the “sale” takes the form of an active auction, a management buy-
out, or a restructuring in which a party acquires control through 
some combination of purchasing newly issued shares from the 
corporation and the corporation repurchasing shares from other 
stockholders.143 
                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 1339–40. 
 137. Id. at 1340. 
 138. Id.  
 139. See id. at 1345 (emphasizing that the board sought to keep the 
company independent and that there was no bidding or sale). 
 140. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
 141. Id. at 1274–75. 
 142. See id. at 1285 n.35 (stating that the primary purpose of the board’s 
actions in Ivanhoe was to “guide the corporation through the minefield of 
dangers directly posed by one bidder, and potentially by another”). 
 143. Id. at 1285. 
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2. The Paradox of Paramount’s Paramours 
This is where things stood when the Delaware Supreme 
Court dealt with a pivotal pair of cases involving efforts by the 
movie company, Paramount, to merge with companies operating 
cable television networks. The result is a paradox worthy of an 
episode in Paramount’s “Star Trek” series. 
In the first case, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,144 
Paramount played the role of spurned suitor to Time—who not 
only published magazines but also operated the HBO network.145 
The prologue to this battle was that Time’s board had entered 
into a merger agreement with another movie company, 
Warner.146 The original merger agreement called for the 
stockholders in Warner to obtain stock in the combined Time–
Warner entity.147 This stock deal, however, required a vote of the 
Time shareholders.148 Before such a vote could take place, 
Paramount beamed in with a generous tender offer to the Time 
shareholders.149 This, in turn, caused Time’s board to restructure 
the transaction with Warner as a cash tender offer to the Warner 
shareholders with a follow-up merger in which the remaining 
Warner shareholders received cash and some securities.150 This 
change meant that Time’s shareholders did not get to vote on the 
deal.151 Paramount and some other Time shareholders sued. 
Some of the plaintiffs argued that the decision of Time’s board to 
merge with Warner—whose pre-merger shareholders under the 
original plan would end up with a larger stake in the combined 
Time–Warner entity than would the pre-merger Time 
shareholders152—put Time up for sale and thereby triggered 
                                                                                                     
 144. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 145. Id. at 1143. 
 146. Id. at 1146. 
 147. Id. at 1145. 
 148. See id. at 1146 (noting that this requirement was imposed by the rules 
of the New York Stock Exchange but not by the Delaware statute). 
 149. See id. at 1147 (stating that Paramount offered to purchase Time’s 
shares for $175 per share, nearly $50 more than their trading price at the time). 
 150. Id. at 1148. 
 151. See id. at 1149 (noting Paramount’s argument that the revised 
agreement was preclusive in part because Time’s shareholders could not vote on 
the merger). 
 152. Under the original Time–Warner merger agreement, the former 
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Revlon.153 Both the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court 
rejected this argument.154 To the Chancery Court the critical 
factor was that the board’s choice under either plan contemplated 
no shift in control over Time because control over Time would 
remain in whatever transitory alliance among numerous 
unaffiliated shareholders created a majority vote in a given 
election.155 While stating that the Chancery Court’s observation 
was correct, the Delaware Supreme Court preferred to place its 
reliance on the fact that the transaction favored by Time’s board 
did not involve the dissolution or breakup of Time, either after 
the board initiated an active bidding process (as in MacMillan) or 
after the board abandoned a defensive posture and sought to sell 
the company (as in Revlon).156 
The notion that sales only trigger Revlon when they involve 
the break-up or dissolution of the company and follow an auction 
or occur as a defensive response to another bid did not last a 
second case involving Paramount. In Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,157 it was Paramount’s 
board that played the role that Time’s board had earlier. It 
                                                                                                     
Warner shareholders would have ended up owning 62% of the combined 
company. Id. at 1146.  
 153. See id. at 1149 (describing the arguments of the shareholder plaintiffs). 
 154. Id. at 1142. 
 155. See id. at 1150 (describing the Chancery Court’s position that no 
change in control had taken place because the majority of shares were still held 
by the market, rather than any individual shareholder). The lack of any change 
in control over Time was certainly true as the deal ended up because the former 
Warner shareholders received mostly cash and some securities rather than 
Time stock. Id. at 1149. Even as the Time–Warner merger was originally 
structured, however, the Chancery Court viewed control over Time to be 
unchanged, despite the receipt by the former Warner shareholders of a majority 
of the voting stock in Time. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 
10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *739 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (“It is 
irrelevant . . . that 62% of Time–Warner stock would have been held by former 
Warner shareholders). Essentially, the Chancery Court conceived of the former 
Warner shareholders as indistinguishable from the original Time 
shareholders—in both cases, the shareholders were simply numerous 
unaffiliated investors in a fluid market. See id. (“[W]here, as here, the shares of 
both constituent corporations are widely held, corporate control can be expected 
to remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger.”). 
 156. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 
(Del. 1989) (stating that these are the two scenarios that trigger Revlon). 
 157. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
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entered into a merger agreement with a cable network company 
(Viacom Inc., who operated Showtime) and then faced a 
competitive bid from another cable network company (QVC, who 
operated the home shopping network).158 The original 
Paramount–Viacom merger agreement contained some 
aggressive deal protection provisions, including a no-shop 
provision that limited Paramount’s ability to talk with competing 
bidders, a $100 million termination fee for Viacom if the deal did 
not go through, and, most significantly, an option for Viacom to 
buy almost 20% of Paramount’s stock cheaply if the deal did not 
go through.159 Paramount’s board refused to consider QVC’s offer. 
Instead, while Paramount’s board renegotiated the merger 
agreement with Viacom in response to QVC’s offer in order to 
change what Paramount’s shareholders received in the Viacom 
deal, Paramount’s board made no effort to change the deal 
protection devices.160 Viewing these devices to be a serious 
barrier, QVC sued.161 
Because the Viacom deal did not involve the breakup or 
dissolution of Paramount either after a board initiated auction or 
in a defensive sale in response to QVC’s bid, Paramount’s board 
assumed that Revlon did not apply.162 The Delaware Supreme 
Court, however, pulled a surprise on Paramount’s board. The 
court focused on the fact that the deal Paramount’s board made 
with Viacom would leave Viacom’s controlling shareholder 
(Sumner Redstone) in control of the combined entity.163 By 
contrast, the court explained, the transaction in Time had left 
control in whatever fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders 
might come together to cast a majority vote in any given 
                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 37–40. 
 159. Id. at 39. 
 160. Id. at 40–41. 
 161. Id. at 40. 
 162. See id. at 46 (noting the defendants’ position that a breakup is 
necessary to trigger Revlon). 
 163. See id. at 43, 46 (emphasizing that Revlon applies in a situation where 
there is a change in corporate control, in this case due to the presence of a 
controlling shareholder). Redstone owned an overwhelming majority of the 
voting stock in Viacom, and the shareholders of Paramount would only receive a 
limited amount of voting (as opposed to non-voting) stock in Viacom. Id. at 38–
40. 
REMOVING REVLON 1523 
election164—in other words, the Delaware Supreme Court 
belatedly decided to rely on the rationale of the Chancery Court 
in Time. 
In the end, the outcome in Time and QVC create something 
of a paradox—the paradox of Paramount’s paramours if you 
will—as far as the application of Revlon. In QVC, the shift in 
control over Paramount to a stranger under the proposed 
Paramount–Viacom merger165 triggered what all assumed was 
the more intensive scrutiny under Revlon as opposed to Unocal. 
By contrast, in Time, the court applied the presumably lesser 
scrutiny of Unocal to Time’s marriage to Warner—even though 
this marriage left Time’s board and management in charge of the 
combined entity.166 As a result, the rule appears to be that the 
greater the conflict of interest by the target’s board (as far as 
retaining the current directors’ and managers’ power), the less 
the court’s scrutiny of the board’s action. 
3. Subsequent Confusion 
Cases after QVC demonstrate the problems Delaware courts 
continue to encounter in deciding what triggers Revlon. As 
discussed earlier,167 Revlon left open the question of whether 
objective circumstances or board decisions trigger the doctrine. 
Actually, this question can manifest itself in a couple of different 
ways. The more common argument would be that even though 
the board had not yet decided to seek a sale implicating Revlon, 
the situation was such that a sale was inevitable (in common 
parlance, the company is “in play”). In Lyondell Chemical Co. v. 
                                                                                                     
 164. See id. at 46–48 (explaining that Time did not implicate Revlon because 
control remained dispersed in the market). 
 165. While Paramount’s CEO apparently was to be the CEO of the combined 
Paramount–Viacom company, the existence of a controlling shareholder of the 
combined company presumably would place the CEO into a subordinate role. Id. 
at 38. 
 166. Indeed, a critical component of the Time–Warner deal was the 
retention of ‘‘Time culture’’ for the company by assuring that senior Time 
executives would end up in charge. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 
571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del. 1989) (noting that several of Time’s directors 
advocated paying a premium to keep the company’s culture intact). 
 167. Supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
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Ryan,168 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the triggering 
event is the board’s decision.169 Flipping the situation around, 
suppose the board decides to seek a buyer who will break up or 
dissolve the company (a Revlon transaction), but, in the end, the 
board only enters a transaction that leaves control in the market. 
In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.,170 the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that a stock-for-stock merger that left 
control in the market did not trigger Revlon even though the 
directors had unsuccessfully sought a bust-up transaction prior to 
agreeing to the stock merger.171 
A more controversial question is whether triggering Revlon 
depends upon the nature of the consideration received by the 
shareholders.172 To the simple minded,173 the most obvious fact 
about the situation in Revlon is that it involved a choice between 
two all-cash all-shares bids.174 As discussed later,175 a 
straightforward explanation for the result in Revlon is that when 
directors decide to sell to one of two bidders, both of whom will 
pay all of the shareholders cash for all of their shares, the only 
legitimate goal is to get the most cash. Strangely, however, 
Revlon,176 MacMillan,177 and later descriptions of those cases by 
the Delaware Supreme Court178 do not focus on this fact. Instead, 
                                                                                                     
 168. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 169. See id. at 242 (“The duty to seek the best available price applies only 
when a company embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in response 
to an unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”). 
 170. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994). 
 171. See id. at 1274, 1289–90 (emphasizing that the board did not initiate a 
bidding process, and that subjective intent is not relevant to the Revlon inquiry). 
 172. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3323–37 (criticizing Delaware 
Chancery Court decisions suggesting that cash sales trigger Revlon). 
 173. Me. 
 174. This was also largely true in Macmillan, in which one bid introduced a 
small amount of subordinated debt. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 
559 A.2d 1261, 1275 (Del. 1989) (stating that less than 10% of one of the bids 
consisted of subordinated securities, with the rest made up of cash). 
 175. See infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text (providing a simple 
explanation for the result in Revlon). 
 176. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon’s 
triggering language). 
 177. See 559 A.2d at 1285 (describing the circumstances in which Revlon is 
triggered). 
 178. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 
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they talk about transactions involving the break-up or dissolution 
of the corporation, either in response a hostile bid or resulting 
from a board initiated auction. In other words, the traditional 
description of what triggered the Revlon decision itself and its 
application in MacMillan focuses on context and process (a 
decision to sell in response to a hostile bid or to auction the 
company) and the outcome for the corporation (dissolution or 
break-up) but not the outcome with respect to the shareholders of 
the corporation (whether they are cashed out).179 Given how 
common cash sales of corporations are,180 the implications of this 
question as to the scope of Revlon is evident. 
The original emphasis on the outcome for the corporation 
(dissolution or break-up) is embedded in the metaphor the court 
employed in Revlon. In Revlon, the court spoke of the board’s 
decision to abandon the role of defender of the corporate 
bastion.181 Before this point, Unocal had allowed the board to 
respond to “a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness.”182 If 
the board, however, decided to abandon the defense of the 
corporation and allow its dissolution or break-up, justifications 
based upon threats to corporate policy and effectiveness were 
presumably inapplicable, and so the idea of triggering the new 
rule based upon what would happen to the corporation seemed to 
follow. 
At first glance, the two cases involving Paramount reinforce 
the notion that the nature of the consideration does not matter. If 
the nature of the consideration was important, then both the 
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court in Time could have 
disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument that Revlon applied by 
pointing out that neither version of the Time–Warner merger 
                                                                                                     
(Del. 1989) (characterizing the aspects of Revlon and MacMillan that triggered 
the Revlon doctrine).  
 179. Perhaps the notion that all of the shareholders will be cashed out is 
implicit in the criteria that the transaction involve the dissolution or break-up of 
the corporation; but there are other ways in which to cash out all of the 
shareholders besides dissolution or break-up. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 16, 
at 1138–39 (describing mechanisms for freezing out minority shareholders 
following an acquisition of control). 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 935–36 (discussing advantages of cash versus stock as 
consideration in the purchase and sale of a corporation). 
 181. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon’s rule). 
 182. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
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cashed out Time’s shareholders (the original iteration being a 
stock-for-stock deal and the final iteration cashing out the 
Warner, rather than the Time, shareholders).183 Moreover, QVC 
applied Revlon despite the competing offers containing 
considerable fractions of equity.184 Even so, QVC introduced an 
important conceptual shift that suggests the nature of the 
consideration might matter. Specifically, in holding that a change 
in control can trigger Revlon, QVC focused on the impact of the 
transaction upon the shareholders—who would find themselves 
in the more dangerous position of minority shareholders in a 
corporation with a controlling shareholder and who would lose 
the ability to share in the proceeds of selling control185—rather 
than the impact of the transaction upon the corporation. If the 
impact upon the shareholders is the trigger, then the dramatic 
impact of being cashed out seems relevant. 
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court opinions are 
inconclusive. In Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court dealt 
with a case in which the Chancery Court held that Lyondell’s 
directors breached their duties under Revlon in approving a cash-
out merger with a privately held company.186 Although rejecting 
the Chancery Court’s notion that Revlon began to apply the 
moment Lyondell was “in play” as opposed to when the directors 
decided to start negotiating the sale, the Delaware Supreme 
Court nevertheless implicitly accepted the conclusion that the 
cash-out merger constituted a change in control triggering 
Revlon.187 On the other hand, was this a change in control 
because cashing out all the existing Lyondell shareholders 
removed their role in the corporation? Or was it a change in 
control because the buyer was a privately held company and so 
                                                                                                     
 183. See supra notes 144–51 accompanying text (explaining the transaction 
at issue in Time). 
 184. See infra notes 210–11 and accompanying text (noting the mix of cash 
and stock in the Viacom and QVC bids). 
 185. See infra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholders’ 
loss of control). 
 186. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237 (Del. 2009) 
(describing the Chancery Court’s ruling). 
 187. See id. at 242–43 (stating that Revlon duties did not kick in until the 
board began to negotiate the merger). 
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control had passed from unaffiliated dispersed shareholders in 
the market? The Delaware Supreme Court never actually said. 
In Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court cited its post-QVC 
opinion in Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation188 for the 
proposition that a change in control triggers Revlon.189 In Santa 
Fe, the court held that Revlon did not apply to a merger with a 
company lacking a controlling shareholder when 33% of the 
shareholders received cash in the transaction and the rest 
received stock.190 What, if anything, this tells us about an entirely 
(or even predominately) cash-out deal, however, is in the eye of 
the beholder.191 
Lacking unequivocal direction from the Delaware Supreme 
Court, the Delaware Chancery Court has issued several opinions 
stating that cash-out mergers may trigger Revlon if the cash 
constitutes a primary proportion of the consideration, even if the 
merger occurs with a company that lacks a controlling 
shareholder such that unaffiliated shareholders in the market 
still ultimately control the combined firms.192 The basic rationale 
is that “there is no long run” for the cashed-out shareholders to 
justify forgoing maximum immediate value in favor of the sort of 
considerations listed in Unocal.193 So far, none of these decisions 
actually has found that the directors breached their fiduciary 
duty under Revlon; albeit a recent decision explicitly applied 
Revlon to a half cash-out/half stock-for-stock merger with a 
company lacking a controlling shareholder.194 
                                                                                                     
 188. 669 A.2d 59 (1995). 
 189. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242. 
 190. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 64–65, 71. 
 191. Compare In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 
2009 WL 3206051, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (characterizing Santa Fe as 
establishing a floor of 33% below which cash would be insufficient to trigger 
Revlon), with Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 57–58 (characterizing Santa Fe as 
establishing that sales to public companies do not trigger Revlon). 
 192. See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 
6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) (emphasizing the 
importance of cash consideration); In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., 2009 WL 
3206051, at *5 (noting that when cash is the exclusive consideration, Revlon is 
triggered); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (discussing the amount of cash consideration that would be sufficient to 
trigger Revlon). 
 193. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d at 732 n.25. 
 194. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, 
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B. What Does Revlon Do? 
Not only has it been uncertain what triggers Revlon, it has 
also been uncertain what Revlon actually does. Specifically, 
Revlon and later cases applying the doctrine suggest three 
possible impacts: (i) limiting the goals directors can pursue in the 
situation; (ii) supplanting general standards governing the 
directors’ conduct and the courts’ review of this conduct with 
more specific rules for the process directors are to follow; and 
(iii) imposing a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny over 
directors’ actions. Unfortunately, Delaware courts have been 
neither clear nor consistent in articulating or applying these 
possible impacts to the doctrine. In part, this is because the 
Delaware Supreme Court has treated these three impacts like the 
three shells in the carnival game in which pea always seems 
magically to appear under a different shell than the player 
guessed. In part, this is because the logical extension of these 
impacts either creates inconsistencies with other principles of 
Delaware corporate law or else suggests that “there is no there 
there” when it comes to the impact of Revlon. 
1. Limitation of Permissible Goals 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Revlon focused 
much of its attention upon the Revlon board’s motive for favoring 
Forstmann’s bid over Pantry Pride’s. Specifically, the court stated 
that Revlon’s board breached its duty because the board acted 
principally to protect Revlon noteholders rather than to obtain 
the best price for Revlon’s shareholders.195 Hence, one aspect of 
the Revlon doctrine seems to be a specification of permissible 
goals for directors to pursue once they enter into the sphere 
governed by Revlon. Yet, it is not clear what this motivational 
aspect of Revlon requires or how it fits with the motivational 
                                                                                                     
at *15 (finding Revlon applicable when half of the stockholders’ investment was 
liquidated). 
 195. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
184 (Del. 1986) (“The principal object, contrary to the board's duty of care, 
appears to have been protection of the noteholders over the shareholders’ 
interests.”). 
REMOVING REVLON 1529 
limitations imposed upon directors’ conduct outside of Revlon. In 
order to understand why this is so, one must work through the 
several layers folded within the court’s conclusion. 
The bottom layer involves why Revlon’s directors cared about 
the interests of the noteholders. The court believed this was 
because the noteholders threatened to sue the directors.196 Hence, 
at first glance, the situation would appear to involve nothing 
more than a simple duty of loyalty violation in which the 
directors put their self-interest in avoiding personal liability 
ahead of their duty to the shareholders. On further reflection, 
however, this is not so simple. Treating fear of personal liability 
as a conflict of interest might suggest that directors or other 
corporate officials have a duty to disregard their other legal 
obligations if doing so will advance shareholder interests—hardly 
a savory proposition.197 In the end, however, the court avoided the 
need to consider such implications by concluding that the 
directors had no duty to the noteholders (and therefore the 
directors’ self-interest flowed from only their incorrect perception 
of a risk of personal liability).198 
Putting aside self-interest, the next question regarding 
legitimate goals was whether the directors could sacrifice 
shareholder interests for the interests of the noteholders. Here, 
the court entered into the long debate about shareholder primacy 
                                                                                                     
 196. See id. (noting the benefit to the directors, who avoided personal 
liability). 
 197. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (stating that the 
certificate of incorporation cannot waive liability for a knowing violation of law); 
GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 326 (“[I]t is unheard of for a court to suggest that a 
director or officer could possibly breach his or her duty to the corporation by 
refusing to have the corporation engage in illegal activity.”). 
 198. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–83 (noting that the noteholders’ rights 
were limited to their contract and that the board owed them no further duty). 
Actually, because directors and other officials can only act based upon their 
perception of legal duties, which can always be wrong, one might legitimately 
worry that a rule placing the risk of such erroneous determinations on directors 
and officers will deter non-erroneous efforts to comply with legal limits on what 
directors can do in search of profits for the shareholders. See, e.g., Bohatch v. 
Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 561 (Tex. 1998) (Spector, J. dissenting) 
(arguing that allowing expulsion of a law firm partner, who reported her 
ultimately erroneous suspicions of overbilling by a fellow partner, will deter 
other lawyers from complying with their ethical obligations to report suspected 
overbilling in the future). 
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versus stakeholder models199 in one of the rare decisions in which 
this actually mattered. Confronted with the language in its 
earlier Unocal decision stating that directors may take into 
account the interests of other corporate constituencies in reacting 
to a hostile tender offer,200 the court in Revlon explained that this 
is only true if there are rationally related benefits accruing to the 
shareholders.201 This, the court concluded, meant that concern for 
non-shareholder interests was no longer appropriate once the 
directors decided to auction rather than protect the company.202 
As explained later in this article,203 this analysis invokes a highly 
traditional, although often highly artificial, reconciliation of 
stakeholder interests with shareholder primacy long found in 
corporate-law decisions in the United States. 
In specifying that self-interest and the interest of other 
constituencies when not tied to the benefit of the shareholders 
were inappropriate goals, the court in Revlon reached a result no 
different than it could have reached by simply applying the 
business judgment rule. On top of these two layers, however, 
Revlon set out a command identifying the goal toward which the 
directors must work. Specifically, the court stated that once the 
situation changed from defending against a takeover to selling 
the company, the central theme guiding the directors should have 
been obtaining the highest price for the shareholders.204 Like a 
shimmering mirage on the desert surface, this command 
promises much and delivers frustration. 
                                                                                                     
 199. See infra note 282 and accompanying text (explaining the shareholder 
primacy debate). 
 200. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) 
(stating that the board can take into account the “impact on ‘constituencies’ 
other than shareholders”). 
 201. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986) (stating that the board can only consider other constituencies if 
there are rationally related benefits to the stakeholders). 
 202. See id. (stating that the board could no longer protect the noteholders 
and claim there were rationally related benefits to the shareholders from doing 
so). 
 203. See infra notes 282–94 and accompanying text (analyzing Revlon in the 
context of the shareholder primacy debate). 
 204. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasizing that the board’s only 
permissible objective is to obtain the best price for shareholders). 
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In part, this may have been because the command makes 
more sense in its original context. In the Revlon opinion, the 
command to obtain the best price for the shareholders largely 
appears in juxtaposition to the impermissible goals of advancing 
the interests of the noteholders and avoiding personal liability for 
the directors.205 Hence, it may simply have meant that the 
directors’ obligation was to put the shareholders’ interest ahead 
of the interests of other constituencies and of the directors’ 
themselves. Moreover, the factual context for this statement in 
Revlon involved a situation in which there were two competing 
all-cash bids with essentially the same method of financing.206 
Having decided to accept one of these bids, what other goal could 
the directors legitimately pursue besides getting the best price? 
Still, the Delaware courts have not been content to leave this 
aspect of Revlon to its original context. Instead, they have 
grabbed at the shiny object and attempted to apply this command 
to contexts in which the choice facing the directors was not 
simply between accepting one of two all-cash bids equivalent in 
their impact on the shareholders except for the price. Like a law 
professor’s hypotheticals that start close to the original case and 
then become increasingly different, this started with a minor 
variant on two all-cash bids. In MacMillan, the contest was 
between one all-cash bid and a blended bid with mostly cash and 
a small amount of subordinated debt securities.207 With nary a 
pause to remark on the difference, the Delaware Supreme Court 
responded by changing the wording of its Revlon command from a 
duty to obtain the “highest price” to a duty to get the “highest 
value reasonably attainable for the shareholders”208 or, at 
another point of the opinion, to obtain the “highest price 
reasonably available to the company, provided it was offered by a 
                                                                                                     
 205. See id. (“[S]uch concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate 
when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is 
to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest 
bidder.”). 
 206. See id. at 184 (finding any difference between the bids nominal at best 
in terms of financing). 
 207. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1274–75 (Del. 
1989). 
 208. Id. at 1288. 
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reputable and responsible bidder.”209 Of course, the presence of 
subordinated debt complicates the comparison of the two bids, 
especially insofar as it may continue to link the fate of the selling 
shareholders to the future fortunes of the company if those 
fortunes turn sufficiently negative to impact the company’s 
ability to service the debt. Still, the presence of a small amount of 
subordinated debt might not seem to leave the situation that 
much changed from Revlon. 
As law students soon discover, once one begins down the road 
of applying the rule despite a seemingly minor difference, the 
trap is sprung and before long one faces much more significant 
differences. In this instance, the significant differences arrived in 
QVC. There, both bids involved a mix of cash and continuing 
equity in the combined company. QVC’s bid involved a cash 
tender offer for 51% of Paramount’s outstanding stock, with the 
remaining 49% receiving QVC common stock in a follow-on 
merger.210 The initial merger agreement with Viacom gave 
Paramount shareholders a small amount of cash and a mix of 
voting and non-voting Viacom stock, while Viacom’s later merger 
agreement matched QVC’s proposal for a cash tender offer for 
51% of Paramount’s stock and then a mix of voting, non-voting 
and convertible preferred shares in Viacom for the other 49%.211 
In response, the Delaware Supreme Court invoked the “best 
value reasonably attainable for the shareholders” formulation 
                                                                                                     
 209. Id. at 1282. The court elaborated on this caveat in a footnote: 
In assessing the bid and the bidder’s responsibility, a board may 
consider, among various proper factors, the adequacy and terms of 
the offer; its fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing 
for the offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions of 
illegality; the impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on 
other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable 
relationship to general shareholder interests; the risk of 
nonconsumation; the basic stockholder interests at stake; the bidder’s 
identity, prior background and other business venture experiences; 
and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and their effects 
on stockholder interests.  
Id. at 1282 n.29. 
 210. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 40–41 
(Del. 1993). 
 211. Id. at 39–41. 
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from MacMillan instead of the best price formulation from Revlon 
as the goal directors must pursue.212 
Yet, how does this best value reasonably attainable for the 
shareholders objective differ from the continuing obligation that 
directors owe to the shareholders in any decision directors make 
regarding a corporate merger or acquisition, or, indeed, in any 
context? Put in terms of a concrete example, how did the 
permissible objective for the Paramount’s directors in agreeing to 
the Viacom merger rather than going with QVC differ from the 
permissible objective for Time’s directors in agreeing to the 
Warner merger rather than going with Paramount in the Time 
case, where, as discussed earlier,213 the court did not apply 
Revlon? The court’s answer is a Rorschach test. 
For those predisposed to find that Revlon narrows the 
acceptable goal for directors, the court in QVC stated that the 
directors should try to quantify the value of any non-cash 
consideration if feasible.214 The court further explained in a 
footnote that the board should focus on the value of the non-cash 
consideration as of the date the shareholders will receive it and 
that such value normally will be determined with the assistance 
of experts using generally accepted methods of valuation.215 By 
contrast, the court in Time explained that whereas Revlon 
triggers a duty to maximize “immediate shareholder value,” 
review under Unocal was not intended to lead to a simple 
“mathematical exercise” of comparing the discounted value of 
Time–Warner shares at some point in the future versus the value 
of Paramount’s offer.216The problem, of course, is that the value of 
the two bids in QVC depended in substantial measure upon the 
future performance of the equity in each packet, which, in turn, 
depended both on the performance of the combined entity 
(Paramount and Viacom or Paramount and QVC) and the 
                                                                                                     
 212. Id. at 43. 
 213. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the Time court’s 
view of Revlon’s applicability). 
 214. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (“Where stock or other non-cash consideration 
is involved, the board should try to quantify its value, if feasible, to achieve an 
objective comparison of the alternatives.”). 
 215. See id. at 44 n.14 (discussing the valuation of non-cash consideration). 
 216. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 
1989). 
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interest in the combined entity represented by the shares 
received by Paramount’s stockholders.217 But these two variables 
were at the heart of the decision facing the directors in Time. 
Specifically, the impact of the originally agreed Time–Warner 
merger on Time’s pre-merger stockholders depended upon 
whether the future earnings of the combined entity outweighed 
the dilution of the stockholders’ interest resulting from issuing 
Time shares to the Warner stockholders.218 Once Paramount 
arrived on the scene with a competitive bid, there was the 
additional question as to whether the value Time’s shareholders 
gained in the Warner merger exceeded what Paramount offered. 
How is the determination of the value called for under QVC and 
Revlon supposed to differ from the more open-ended goals 
analysis allowed under Time? Is the court saying that because 
Revlon did not apply, Time’s directors were free to ignore whether 
the increased earnings from the Time–Warner combination would 
at least eventually offset the dilution suffered by Time’s pre-
merger shareholders or whether Paramount’s offer provided 
better value for Time’s stockholders than the Warner 
combination no matter how and when measured? 
Maybe the court is saying that without Revlon directors are 
entitled to use their own informed judgment on whether a 
combination or other decision enhances shareholder value, but 
once Revlon applies directors must look to the market valuations 
of exchanged securities.219 Yet other language in QVC casts doubt 
on this interpretation. Specifically, the court in QVC elevated to 
text its footnote in MacMillan in which it discussed the latitude 
open to directors in weighing bids under Revlon.220 So, the court 
                                                                                                     
 217. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 16, at 918–36 (discussing valuation in 
the context of selling a corporation, including the impact when sellers receive 
shares in the purchasing corporation). 
 218. See id. at 935 (discussing the impact on the purchasing corporation’s 
shareholders of issuing shares to purchase another corporation). 
 219. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The 
Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. Rev. 521, 523–24 (2002) 
(explaining Revlon as a situation in which courts focus on “visible” (market) 
value to measure a transaction’s merits, instead of allowing directors to act 
based upon their potential knowledge of the corporation’s “hidden” value that 
market price does not reflect). 
 220. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 
1994). 
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explained, directors are entitled under Revlon to take into 
account an offer’s fairness and feasibility as well as the bidder’s 
business plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder 
interest.221 To reinforce the point, the court also stated that the 
directors are not limited to considering only the amount of cash 
involved—which would seem rather obvious when the bid 
includes significant non-cash consideration—and, of seemingly 
greater importance, are not required to ignore totally the board’s 
view of the future value of a strategic alliance.222 
Perhaps the answer is not found in what the court said but in 
what it actually did. In finding that Paramount’s directors 
breached their duty, the court pointed to the one billion dollar 
advantage of the QVC bid over the Viacom bid when measured by 
the current market value of the securities involved and stated 
that Paramount’s directors could not justify giving up this much 
advantage based upon their vision of future strategy.223 While the 
court based this conclusion in part upon the board’s loss of 
credibility as a result of the board’s poor process, the court 
explained that the primary reason for discounting valuation 
based upon future strategy was because the current board would 
not be in control of Paramount after the merger in order to carry 
out its strategic vision.224 So, is the court saying that market 
valuation trumps under Revlon and that a change in control 
precludes consideration of the added value of a strategic 
combination beyond that recognized in market prices, or is the 
court saying that directors must justify disregarding huge 
disparities in market valuations of competing bids and that a new 
management’s continued willingness to implement the outgoing 
board’s strategic plan following a change in control is too 
uncertain a reed upon which to justify such a huge disparity? We 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. (discussing the evaluation of bids) (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989)). 
 222. See id. at 44 (“In determining which alternative provides the best value 
for the stockholders, a board of directors is not limited to considering only the 
amount of cash involved, and is not required to ignore totally its view of the 
future value of a strategic alliance.”). 
 223. See id. at 50 (explaining how the value of QVC’s bid outweighed any 
strategic benefits from accepting Viacom’s bid). 
 224. See id. (noting the change in control would remove the board’s 
authority to implement its strategic vision). 
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shall return to this question when we consider whether Revlon 
imposes a higher level of judicial scrutiny over directors’ decisions 
than imposed by Unocal. 
In the meantime, this language in QVC starts to shift our 
attention from goals to process. Specifically, another way of 
viewing the language about valuing non-cash consideration with 
the aid of experts using accepted methods of valuation is that the 
overall goal for directors remains the same—get the best value 
for the shareholders—but now the process directors should use in 
working toward this goal has narrowed. This brings us to the 
second possible impact of Revlon. 
2. Substitution of Process Rules for General Standards of Conduct 
and Review 
Early in their legal studies, many law students in the United 
States read a pair of Supreme Court opinions that deal with 
accidents at railroad crossings.225 In the first case, Justice Holmes 
announced a rule that an automobile driver who approaches a 
railroad track at which the driver cannot see if there is an 
oncoming train must stop the car and get out and look, and that 
the failure to do so amounts to negligence precluding recovery.226 
In the second case, Justice Cardozo confronted a situation in 
which the existence of four parallel tracks at the crossing would 
have rendered an effort to follow this “stop, get out and look rule” 
impractical.227 Justice Cardozo’s solution is to explain that there 
is no “stop, get out and look rule”; rather, the only rule is that the 
driver must act reasonably under the circumstances and the 
driver in the prior case had not done so under the particular facts 
                                                                                                     
 225. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 60–64 (8th ed. 2011) 
(including these cases as part of a fundamental study of tort law).  
 226. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69–70 (1927) 
(“In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise 
whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his 
vehicle . . . .”). 
 227. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 101 (1934) (“This does not 
mean, however, that if vision was cut off by obstacles, there was negligence in 
going on . . . .”). 
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of that case.228 The purpose of reading these cases is not to learn 
about railroad crossing accidents. Rather, in addition to raising 
the roles of judges and juries, these opinions expose students to a 
fundamental tension between governing conduct with specific 
rules or with general standards.229 When setting forth the impact 
of Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has tried to have it both 
ways.230 The result has been confusion. 
This confusion came to something of a head a few years ago 
in Lyondell. The situation in Lyondell reminds one a little of the 
famous Smith v. Van Gorkom decision,231 albeit in Lyondell the 
board seemed to have carefully analyzed the deal, including 
receiving the opinion of an investment banking firm (who 
described the offer as “an absolute home run”).232 Even though 
the shareholders approved the deal by a 99% vote,233 some 
shareholders still brought a class action alleging that the 
directors breached their duty.234 Despite these circumstances, the 
plaintiff was able to avoid summary judgment in the Chancery 
Court based upon the argument that Revlon applied; that Revlon 
required the directors to conduct an auction prior to, or a market 
test after, accepting the cash-out deal unless the directors could 
establish they had impeccable knowledge of the market; and that 
                                                                                                     
 228. See id. at 102–06 (acknowledging that the rule should not apply in all 
instances where such conduct would not be expected of a reasonable man under 
the circumstances). 
 229. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
 230. Delaware courts frequently have tried to gain the advantage of specific 
guidelines within general standards by providing directors “safe harbor” 
suggestions for processes that will clearly comply with fiduciary duties. See, e.g., 
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“This Court has endeavored to 
provide the directors with clear signal beacons and brightly lined-channel 
markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, and loyalty on behalf of a 
Delaware corporation and its shareholders.”); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 
673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996) (acknowledging that safe harbors “remove[] the 
specter of a post hoc judicial determination that the director or officer has 
improperly usurped a corporate opportunity”). This is different, however, from 
mandating specific processes. 
 231. See 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding directors breached their duty of 
care in voting to sell the corporation in a two hour meeting based upon a twenty 
minute oral presentation and without asking many questions). 
 232. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238–39 (Del. 2009). 
 233. Id. at 239. 
 234. Id. 
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there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the directors 
had such impeccable knowledge.235 The Delaware Supreme Court 
would have none of this. Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained that Revlon does not mandate an auction or any special 
procedure; it mandates a goal of obtaining the highest price.236 
So, how did the Chancery Court in Lyondell manage to get 
this wrong? Telling the story in flashbacks, one sees a pattern of 
confusing signals from the Delaware Supreme Court. This starts, 
not surprisingly, in Revlon itself. The problem resulted from the 
fact that recognizing a duty to get the highest price did not 
immediately resolve the Revlon case. At the time Revlon’s board 
acted, the Forstmann bid favored by the board was slightly 
higher than the Pantry Pride bid, which the board disfavored.237 
The court in Revlon held that this slight advantage did not justify 
granting Forstmann lock-up and no-shop agreements that 
deterred a further bid by Pantry Pride.238 The simple explanation 
was that the board cut off further bidding not because the board 
felt that it had extracted as high a price as it could but rather to 
ensure that the bid protecting the noteholders (and the directors 
themselves from lawsuits) prevailed,239 which, as discussed 
above,240 is not a permissible goal. Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court did not stop there. Instead, it also threw in language 
suggesting that directors breach their duty by playing favorites 
when auctioning the company and that market forces must be 
allowed to operate freely to obtain the best price available for the 
shareholders.241 From this nugget grew the notion that Revlon 
                                                                                                     
 235. See id. at 241, 243 (discussing the Chancery Court’s basis for denying 
summary judgment). 
 236. See id. at 242 (noting that there is no specific way the directors must 
acquire the highest price). 
 237. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (comparing the Forstmann 
and Pantry Pride bids). 
 238. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
184 (Del. 1986) (noting that these provisions were impermissible when they did 
not work to secure the highest bid). 
 239. See id. (“The principal benefit went to the directors, who avoided 
personal liability to a class of creditors to whom the board owed no further duty 
under the circumstances.”). 
 240. See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text (elaborating on the 
court’s implementation of the shareholder primacy theory). 
 241. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (”Market forces must be allowed to operate 
freely to bring the target’s shareholders the best price available for their 
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imposes process rules directors must follow.242 Subsequent 
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court have vacillated 
between taming and inflaming this notion (sometimes both in the 
same opinion). 
Having seemingly condemned playing favorites in auctioning 
the company, the Delaware Supreme Court felt compelled to 
explain in MacMillan that directors have no independent duty to 
conduct fair auctions for the sake of fair auctions.243 Rather, the 
directors can favor one bidder.244 The directors’ duty in a Revlon 
situation is simply to get the best price for the shareholders, and 
the directors must justify any favoritism based upon achieving 
this goal.245 So what then is the point of the language in Revlon 
about not playing favorites and allowing market forces to work? 
Fair auctions provide a means both for obtaining the highest 
price and for verifying that the price is, in fact, the highest.246 
This, however, raises the question of whether directors can use 
other tools to obtain and verify the highest price in selling the 
company, and, if so, what are the other tools. 
The Delaware Supreme Court discussed this question at 
some length in Barkan v. Amstead Industries.247 This discussion 
began with the reassurance that Revlon does not command a 
heated bidding contest (an auction) before any sale of control.248 
The court then broke down situations that might arise into two 
possibilities.249 The first was multiple bidders competing for 
control. Here, the court returned to the admonition that fairness 
                                                                                                     
equity.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3315 (indicating that the courts 
have drawn lines as to what action is permissible under Revlon). 
 243. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286–87 
(Del. 1989) (noting that directors need not follow some standard formula when 
initiating an auction). 
 244. See id. (recognizing that favoring one bidder is allowed, so long as it is 
for the benefit of the stockholders). 
 245. See id. (noting that there must be a rational basis for any favoritism 
involved). 
 246. See generally Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 
25 J. ECON. LIT. 669 (1987). 
 247. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989). 
 248. Id. at 1286. 
 249. See id. at 1286–87 (discussing instances of multiple bidders and single 
bidders). 
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to the shareholders precludes using defensive mechanisms to 
favor one bidder over another,250 leading one to wonder what 
happened to MacMillan’s statement that favoritism was 
allowable if justified by getting the best deal for the shareholders. 
Of significance to Lyondell, the court also discussed the situation 
in which there was only one bidder. In this circumstance, the 
court stated that unless the directors have reliable grounds for 
determining if the one bid is adequate, they must canvass the 
market to determine if higher bids might be available.251 
Moreover, in commenting on what might constitute reliable 
information sufficient to forgo canvassing the market, the court 
cautioned that the advice of an investment banker is often a poor 
substitute for a market test to determine the adequacy of a single 
bid.252 Given this discussion, it is not surprising that the 
Chancery Court in Lyondell thought that directors in a Revlon 
situation without competing bidders must test the market unless 
they can establish their impeccable knowledge of the market.253 
Indeed, one suspects the Chancery Court judge may have felt 
betrayed by the Delaware Supreme Court’s “now you tell me” 
explanation that Revlon does not impose any specific process 
obligations—at least until the Delaware Supreme Court says 
something different again in another opinion. 
3. Heightened Scrutiny 
The final impact of Revlon is a notion of heightened scrutiny. 
What this heightened scrutiny entails is not entirely clear. In 
part, this is because the concept of heightened scrutiny gets 
mixed together with statements of acceptable goals and a 
specification of required process. In part, this is because it is 
                                                                                                     
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. at 1287 (“When the board is considering a single offer and has 
no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness 
demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited.”) 
(citing In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., CIV A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 
83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988)). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241 (Del. 2009) (noting 
the Chancery Court’s emphasis on the fact that directors failed to conduct “even 
a limited market check”). 
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uncertain how this heightened scrutiny meshes with the Unocal 
standard and with the standards applicable to reviewing director 
decisions generally.  
As discussed earlier,254 judicial scrutiny of directors’ decisions 
generally falls within the deferential standard of the business 
judgment rule unless there is a conflict of interest without 
disinterested approval, in which case the intrusive intrinsic 
fairness test becomes applicable. Unocal establishes an 
intermediate standard for takeover defenses under which 
directors seemingly must prove the reasonableness of their 
actions both in terms of objectives and means.255 Where does 
Revlon fit into this? Specifically, when it comes to the degree of 
scrutiny, does Revlon do anything more than Unocal? There are 
two possibilities for doing more than Unocal: Revlon might 
establish a new intermediate standard which is more demanding 
than Unocal, albeit less demanding than the intrinsic fairness 
test; or Revlon might extend Unocal’s reasonableness standard to 
situations previously covered by the business judgment rule 
standard. 
In MacMillan, the Delaware Supreme Court equated the 
degree of scrutiny under Unocal and Revlon. Specifically, the 
court explained that if there is favoritism for one bidder over 
another in auctioning the company, then the court must examine 
under Unocal’s reasonableness standard whether the directors 
perceived that the favoritism would advance shareholder 
interests and whether the favoritism was reasonable in relation 
to the advantage the directors sought to achieve.256 By contrast, 
the two Delaware Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
Paramount’s paramours (Time and QVC) provide more confusing 
signals. Recall that the Delaware Supreme Court in these two 
cases confronted arguments by the parties about whether Revlon 
                                                                                                     
 254. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text (comparing decisions 
evaluated under the business judgment rule and conflict-of-interest 
transactions). 
 255. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (discussing the Unocal 
standard). 
 256. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286–88 
(Del. 1989) (discussing the process to determine if disparate treatment was 
appropriate). 
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or just Unocal applied.257 If Revlon does not establish a more 
demanding standard than Unocal, the Supreme Court might 
have disposed of the whole issue by saying it did not matter. 
Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC couched its 
distinguishing Time and exploring whether Revlon applied in 
terms of whether the court will employ “enhanced scrutiny” of the 
board’s decision,258 which seems to suggest that Revlon requires 
some higher level of scrutiny than Unocal.  
Perhaps the enhanced scrutiny the court spoke of in QVC 
referred to ensuring directors complied with some greater process 
required under Revlon but not Unocal or with a narrowing of 
acceptable goals under Revlon as opposed to under Unocal. 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, there is language in Time and QVC 
suggesting a narrowing of the acceptable goal for the board under 
Revlon.259 Still, one can read this language not as narrowing the 
permissible goal for directors but as increasing the scrutiny 
applied by the court. So, to return to the passage in QVC in which 
the court points to the $1 billion greater market value of the QVC 
bid over the Viacom offer followed by the statement that this 
disparity could not be justified by the Paramount directors’ vision 
of future strategy,260 this might mean that directors must focus 
their attention on the getting the most value for the shareholders 
as measured by market prices. On the other hand, this could 
reflect a greater level of scrutiny under which the court is willing 
to examine market prices and other factors to decide for itself 
whether the shareholders got the best value rather than 
deferring to the directors’ balancing of market valuations versus 
the directors’ internal assessments.261 The Delaware Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra notes 153, 163–164 and accompanying text (discussing the 
arguments in Time and QVC over whether Revlon or just Unocal applied). 
 258. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44–
46 (Del. 1994) (noting the enhanced scrutiny that applies when Revlon duties 
are applicable). 
 259. See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text (examining the court’s 
recommendations for evaluating non-cash consideration). 
 260. QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (stating that the disparity in market value 
between the two offers outweighed any benefits provided by a strategic alliance). 
 261. To pursue this thought further, the court’s statement that a change in 
control renders a valuation based upon future strategy insufficient to justify a 
huge disparity in market valuation could be read to suggest that directors 
cannot consider future strategy very much or it could be read to reflect a court 
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Court’s decision in Arnold suggests, in fact, that this is about 
scrutiny rather than goals or process. Specifically, the court, in a 
footnote, scolded the plaintiff’s attorney for referring to “Revlon 
duties” in order “inappropriately” to describe the “enhanced 
scrutiny courts apply to certain types of transactions.”262 
Beyond the question of whether Revlon creates a higher level 
of scrutiny than Unocal, there is also the question of whether 
Revlon extends an intermediate level of scrutiny to situations not 
covered by Unocal and, hence, otherwise subject to evaluation 
under the deferential approach of the business judgment rule. 
Lyondell provides an illustration of this issue. As mentioned 
above,263 Lyondell involved the sort of cash-out merger negotiated 
with a solitary bidder reminiscent of Van Gorkom.264 In Van 
Gorkom, the plaintiff had to establish the directors were grossly 
negligent in order to prevail under the business judgment rule.265 
This would appear to suggest that the business judgment 
rule/gross negligence standard would also apply to Lyondell.266 
Moreover, in response to the Van Gorkom decision, the Delaware 
legislature amended Delaware’s corporation statute to authorize 
certificates of incorporation to waive liability of directors for 
monetary damages except in certain cases, including actions not 
in good faith.267 Lyondell’s certificate of incorporation contained 
such a waiver.268 This, in turn, suggests that good faith 
established the appropriate standard for reviewing the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                     
much more willing to exercise its own judgment about the value to accord a 
future strategy when it is uncertain whether the strategy will be implemented 
following a change in control. 
 262. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 
1994). 
 263. Supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 264. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238–39 (Del. 2009) 
(discussing the terms of the merger). 
 265. See supra note 39 (discussing the standard of care applied under the 
business judgment rule). 
 266. Because Van Gorkom predates Revlon, however, it is possible that the 
Delaware Supreme Court would have applied Revlon to Van Gorkom had the 
order of the decisions been reversed. 
 267. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (allowing a provision that 
limits or eliminates directors’ liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, but not 
allowing such a waiver for acts not in good faith). 
 268. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009). 
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claim in Lyondell. Yet, the court in Lyondell assumed that 
accepting a cash-out offer, at least from a privately controlled 
buyer, constituted the sale of control under QVC and hence fell 
under Revlon.269 This suggests more rigorous scrutiny of the 
board’s action than either the business judgment rule or good 
faith standards. The Chancery Court in Lyondell tried to 
reconcile all this by holding that the conscious failure to comply 
with Revlon’s process requirements—conduct an auction, conduct 
a market test, or establish the directors’ impeccable knowledge of 
the market—established a lack of good faith.270 In reversing the 
Chancery Court’s decision, the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained that Revlon did not command any particular process.271 
This, however, still leaves the question of what is the degree of 
scrutiny that the court should apply. The Delaware Supreme 
Court in Lyondell found it necessary for the plaintiff to establish 
a lack of good faith.272 Yet, all this may show is that certificates of 
incorporation can waive monetary damages from Revlon claims so 
long as the directors acted in good faith. Such waivers, however, 
do not apply to actions pursuing an injunction.273 Hence, the 
question continues as to whether, in cases seeking injunctive 
relief, Revlon mandates heightened judicial scrutiny of the 
garden variety sale of the corporation for cash outside of any 
takeover contest that courts for decades had reviewed under the 
business judgment rule. 
Beyond this, Lyondell’s application of the good faith standard 
to some Revlon situations exposes a more fundamental problem: 
Specifically, what is the justification for ever applying heightened 
scrutiny in Revlon situations? As stated earlier,274 heightened 
                                                                                                     
 269. See id. at 242–43 (determining that Revlon duties did not kick in until 
the board began to evaluate and negotiate the merger). 
 270. See id. at 242 (explaining how the trial court conflated the board’s 
inaction with bad faith). 
 271. See id. at 242 (rejecting a process requirement). 
 272. See id. at 243 (requiring a finding of failure to act in good faith to find 
for the plaintiffs). 
 273. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (permitting waiver of 
claims for monetary damages). In fact, most cases involving Revlon seek 
injunctive relief. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3319–20. 
 274. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing the higher 
level of scrutiny in conflict-of-interest scenarios compared to that applied under 
the business judgment rule). 
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judicial scrutiny traditionally stems from concerns over conflict of 
interest. As discussed later,275 concerns with conflict of interest in 
a final period situation is one rationale asserted on behalf of the 
Revlon doctrine. Yet, the presence of a conflict of interest means 
we are dealing with a duty of loyalty, rather than a duty of care, 
claim.276 Duty of loyalty claims, like claims for acts not in good 
faith, are not subject to waiver under Section 102(b)(7) of 
Delaware’s corporation statute.277 Hence, by abandoning strict 
scrutiny of Revlon claims seeking monetary damages in favor of a 
good faith standard whenever faced with a Section 102(b)(7) 
waiver, the Lyondell opinion not only limits the practical impact 
of Revlon, but also may substantially undercut the underlying 
rationale behind the doctrine. This provides a segue into asking 
whether there is any sensible rationale behind the doctrine. 
IV. The Futile Search for a Sensible Underlying Rationale 
Normally, courts can look to a doctrine’s underlying rationale 
to help resolve the issues regarding the doctrine’s scope and 
impact, which the Delaware courts have encountered in applying 
Revlon. With Revlon, however, the failure of the Delaware courts 
to resolve such issues satisfactorily is symptomatic of the fact 
that there really is no sensible underlying rationale for the 
doctrine. 
A. Disparate Cases, Disparate Rationales 
There are three cases in which the Delaware Supreme Court 
actually held that directors, under Revlon, breached their 
fiduciary duty. The result in the first two, and perhaps all three, 
is reasonable. The attempt to tie the cases altogether into one 
                                                                                                     
 275. See infra notes 356–61 and accompanying text (explaining the 
incentives problem in a final periods scenario). 
 276. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 340 (describing conflict-of-interest 
transactions as presenting the danger that directors “will favor themselves at 
the expense of the corporation,” bringing the duty of loyalty into play).  
 277. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (stating that the certificate 
of incorporation cannot eliminate or limit a director’s liability for a breach of the 
duty of loyalty). 
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coherent doctrine, however, has simply created unhelpful 
complexity and, in turn, confusion. 
1. Revlon 
Revlon is really about whether directors must maximize 
shareholder value, as opposed to protecting stakeholder interests, 
in the rare case in which the court could not dodge the issue. As 
discussed above, Revlon’s board faced a choice between two all-
cash bids with essentially the same impact upon the shareholders 
except for the price.278 Hence, even the deference called for under 
the business judgment rule (let alone the more demanding 
Unocal standard) should not protect the directors if, without 
explanation, they simply chose the lower price bid.279 The facts in 
Revlon are a little more complicated because the directors took 
the slightly higher price bid and cut off further bidding through a 
lock-up agreement.280 Critically, however, the court found that 
the directors had ended the auction not because the directors felt 
that they had extracted the highest price but rather because the 
bid, which thereby prevailed, protected the holders of certain 
notes (debt) issued by Revlon.281 Hence, the question was whether 
Revlon’s directors could sacrifice the highest price for the 
shareholders in order to protect certain Revlon creditors. 
                                                                                                     
 278. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
176–78 (Del. 1986) (discussing the terms of the deals offered in the merger 
transaction). 
 279. Notice in this regard the critical role played by the fact that the 
situation involved two all-cash bids with equivalent impact upon the 
shareholders except for the price. If there had been only one bid, then instead of 
an easy comparison of price, there would be the much more difficult comparison 
of the one bid against the future earnings prospects of the company or the 
uncertain prospects for some future higher offer. Similarly, if either or both of 
the two bids involved significant non-cash consideration or otherwise differed in 
their impact upon the shareholders in ways less measurable than a cash price, 
then again there would be a much more difficult comparison. In either of these 
more difficult cases, there exist the sorts of judgmental factors that normally 
make it vastly more difficult to say that directors breached their duty. 
 280. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179. 
 281. See id. at 184 (”The principal object, contrary to the board’s duty of 
care, appears to have been protection of the noteholders over the shareholders’ 
interests.”). 
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Over the years, academics have spent considerable ink 
arguing over whether the directors’ duty is to maximize the 
welfare of the shareholders (often called the shareholder primacy 
norm) or whether the directors can sacrifice shareholder profits to 
advance the interests of other stakeholders in the corporation 
such as employees, creditors and the like.282 For the most part, 
this debate has been more of interest to academics than 
important to the actual operation of the law. While courts pay lip 
service to the notion that directors must maximize shareholder 
welfare, application of the business judgment rule leaves the 
balancing of interests between shareholders and other corporate 
stakeholders within the largely unchecked discretion of the board 
of directors. 
The leading case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,283 illustrates the 
point.284 Though the court’s opinion in Dodge contains oft-quoted 
language to the effect that the directors breach their duty if they 
act to change the end objective of the corporation from profiting 
the shareholders to seeking to benefit others,285 the court actually 
                                                                                                     
 282. See generally Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern 
Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 641 (2011); Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going Private” 
on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 72 (2008); Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247 (1999); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom 
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 17. 
 283. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 284. The Dodge brothers were minority shareholders in Ford Motor Co. Id. 
at 669. Henry Ford owned a majority of the outstanding stock and dominated 
the board. Id. at 671. Ford Motor Co. at this time was unbelievably successful. 
See id. at 670 (describing the company’s increasing profits). The Dodge brothers 
sued after Henry Ford announced that the corporation would not pay any more 
special dividends, but, instead, would retain the extra earnings for expansion. 
Id. at 671. 
 285. Statements by Henry Ford, both in and out of court, suggest that his 
reason for expanding the business was not to maximize profits, but, rather, 
stemmed from his desire to implement his economic and social views. Id. at 671. 
Specifically, Henry Ford expressed the view that the company should lower the 
price of its cars and expand its production, not to increase profits, but in order to 
enable more Americans to own a car and to provide employment for more 
persons. Id. at 672. The court took a different view of the permissible goals of a 
business corporation. Such a corporation (as opposed to an entity organized as a 
nonprofit corporation) exists, the court explained, “primarily for the profit of the 
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allowed Henry Ford to forgo obedience to maximizing shareholder 
profits on the off chance that the shareholders might end up 
better off anyway.286 The practical upshot of cases like Dodge is 
that, by and large, courts have not scrutinized business decisions 
to see whether directors sacrificed profit maximization to advance 
the interests of employees, creditors, customers and the 
community.287 Instead, the courts almost invariably accept some 
rationale as to how the business decisions were in the long range 
interest of the shareholders.288 The statement in Unocal that 
directors can consider the interests of other constituencies, such 
as employees, creditors and even the community generally, in 
reacting to a takeover attempt289 is consistent with this approach. 
Revlon presented an extreme situation in which the court felt 
it could no longer say that advancing the interests of other 
corporate constituencies (in this case, the noteholders) might 
somehow benefit the shareholders in the long run.290 Normally, 
                                                                                                     
stockholders.” Id. at 684. 
 286. See id. (refusing to interfere with the proposed expansion). The court in 
Dodge ordered the payment of a special dividend; but this was only because 
Ford Motor Co. had plenty of money both to expand and to pay the dividend. See 
id. at 685 (noting that company’s excess of cash). Critically, however, the court 
refused to block the corporation’s expansion plans, despite what the court had to 
say concerning Henry Ford’s express motivations for those plans. See id. at 684 
(acknowledging the court’s limited ability to determine whether the proposed 
expansion was a good business decision). The court felt that the expansion plans 
might serve a business purpose and refused to substitute the court’s judgment 
for the business expertise of the directors. Id. 
 287. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 775 (2005) (noting that courts have not been 
overly wary of those methods). 
 288. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968) 
(finding that defendants, directors of the Chicago Cubs, acted in the interest of 
shareholders in refusing to allow night games at Wrigley Field because any 
benefits to the surrounding neighborhood would be reflected in increased 
attendance and increased value of the corporation’s real estate); A.P. Smith Mfg. 
Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (finding that defendant corporation’s 
charitable donations provided shareholders with long-term benefit). 
 289. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 
1985) (”Examples of such concerns [affecting the reasonableness of the board’s 
decision] may include . . . the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders . . . .”). 
 290. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
175 (Del. 1986) (finding that consideration for other constituencies must at least 
rationally benefit the shareholders). 
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directors might argue that showing solicitude for the interest of 
corporate creditors beyond the requirements the debt contract 
can be in the long run interest of shareholders by encouraging 
creditors to loan money to the company on favorable terms in the 
future. There was simply no basis for such an argument in 
Revlon. Significantly, there are two reasons for this, making it 
uncertain whether the court relied on one, the other, or both. The 
more obvious reason is that the directors were choosing between 
two all-cash all-shares bids essentially equivalent in their 
financing.291 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how 
the shareholders could somehow be better off in the long run by 
taking a lower priced bid on the ground that it better protected 
corporate creditors. After all, having been completely cashed out 
in the deal, there seems little way for the shareholders to benefit 
from whatever happens to the company, including its enhanced 
ability to borrow money, thereafter. The alternate reason 
involved the bidders’ plans for the corporation. Specifically, they 
planned to break-up Revlon and sell off its pieces.292 Breaking up 
the corporation renders its good relations with creditors 
irrelevant. Because the court could not come up with an 
argument under these facts that what is good for stakeholders is 
also good for shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that the directors could not consider the interest of the 
noteholders.293 Once the court reached this conclusion, the case 
was done and the rest of the opinion unnecessary.294 
                                                                                                     
 291. See id. at 177–79 (discussing the terms of the various bids). 
 292. See id. at 178 (discussing the plan for the disposition of Revlon’s 
assets). 
 293. See id. at 182 (stating that the board could not consider the interests of 
the noteholders when, because of the sale and breakup, there was no rational 
benefit to the shareholders from considering the noteholders). 
 294. One wrinkle, however, lies in the fact that the bid protecting the 
noteholders was slightly higher at the time the board effectively ended the 
competition than the competing bid. A second wrinkle lies in the possibility that 
the directors may have mistakenly thought themselves under some legal 
obligation to the noteholders. Under these circumstances, a court which 
displayed as much willingness to wink at actual motives as occurred in Dodge 
might have found that Revlon’s directors acted consistently with shareholder 
interests or otherwise in accord with their duty despite their actual motive or 
mistake of law. The heightened scrutiny entailed by Unocal may explain this. In 
other words, while Unocal allows directors to consider the interests of other 
stakeholders in responding to a hostile tender offer, the heightened scrutiny 
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Implicit in this analysis is a defining assumption about the 
measure of shareholder welfare. Specifically, underlying the 
decision in Revlon is the view that one measures the 
shareholders’ interest solely in terms of the ownership in this one 
corporation without regard to other investments shareholders 
might have in their portfolios or other interests they might have 
as members of society. Otherwise, it could be possible to 
rationalize sacrificing the highest price for the Revlon stock in 
favor of protecting the noteholders as still being in the 
shareholders’ interest. Specifically, given the notes’ origin as 
consideration received pro-rata by Revlon’s shareholders who 
oversubscribed Revlon’s self-tender,295 it is quite possible that 
many Revlon stockholders still held some of these notes. More 
broadly, perhaps other corporations in which the Revlon 
shareholders own stock could obtain loans on better terms in the 
future if the Delaware court held that directors can accept lower 
price bids for the company when those bids better protect 
corporate creditors.296 
A recent article by Stephen Bainbridge297 seems to take a 
different view of the appropriate measure of shareholder interest 
under Revlon. Professor Bainbridge criticizes the Delaware 
Chancery Court decisions discussed above which stated that 
                                                                                                     
under Unocal could mean that the court will not uncritically accept any 
rationale that advancing the interest of the stakeholders in opposing a tender 
offer is also in the interest of the shareholders (as it would under the business 
judgment rule) but, instead, will consider for itself whether this supposition is 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
Of course, one might agree or disagree with Revlon’s prohibition on 
directors from sacrificing the interests of the shareholders for other 
stakeholders when there is no rational argument as to how this might be in the 
long-range interest of the shareholders, but such debate is far beyond the scope 
of this Article.  
 295. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing the initial 
distribution of the notes). 
 296. Indeed, this could apply well beyond the facts in Revlon. Lynn Stout 
and Margaret Blair’s team production theory would support an argument that 
shareholders with diversified portfolios of corporate stocks could prefer to take 
actions sacrificing maximum value in mergers and sales in order to protect the 
interests of workers, as this would promote firm-specific investments of human 
capital in other ventures in which the shareholders own, or might in the future 
own, stock. See Blair & Stout, supra note 282, at 275 (arguing that it is in the 
shareholders’ interest to promote workers’ investment in working for the firm). 
 297. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 8. 
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cash-out bids trigger Revlon.298 He argues instead that only deals 
which pass control to private parties come within QVC’s sale of 
control trigger.299 His rationale is that a sale of control to a 
publicly held buyer still enables the target company’s 
stockholders to share in any benefits of the deal not reflected in 
the price they received, because diversified investors are as likely 
to hold shares in the buyer as they are in the target.300 
Accepting this sort of portfolio-based approach to 
determining shareholder interest would radically rewrite 
corporate law in ways reaching far beyond Revlon. As just 
discussed, it would eviscerate what little teeth Revlon gives to the 
shareholder primacy norm. More radically, this portfolio theory of 
shareholder interest would transform commonplace corporate 
decisions into a breach of the directors’ duties. Specifically, if one 
assumes that shareholders have diversified portfolios in which 
they invest in competing corporations, then advertising and other 
actions aimed at building market share at the expense of a 
company’s publicly held competitors do not advance shareholder 
interests. As a result, such actions constitute waste (actions 
serving no legitimate purpose).301 
2. MacMillan 
MacMillan presents a different issue than Revlon. 
MacMillan’s board accepted a bid for a management buyout 
(MBO) over a competing bid.302 The participants in the MBO 
included MacMillan’s CEO and COO (chief operating officer), the 
CEO also being the chairman of MacMillan’s board.303 This 
means that the board’s acceptance of this bid, including the 
agreement to a lock-up provision that effectively cut off further 
                                                                                                     
 298. See generally id. 
 299. See id. at 3337–38 (discussing the “roadmap” for when Revlon applies). 
 300. See id. at 3310–11, 3335 (noting that fully diversified shareholders 
should be indifferent to the allocation of gains between the two entities). 
 301. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979) (stating 
that expenditures without consideration or serving no corporate purpose equal 
waste). 
 302. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1273 (Del. 
1989). 
 303. Id. at 1265. 
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bidding, presented a classic conflict-of-interest transaction. The 
court found that the CEO and COO failed to inform the other 
directors of material facts about the transaction. Specifically, 
they did not inform the board that they had tipped the 
individuals in charge of the MBO’s bid about the relative status 
of the two bids.304 This tip had undermined the effectiveness of 
the final phase of the blind auction to obtain the highest price 
possible.305 The failure to disclose this conduct meant that 
MacMillan’s disinterested directors acted in the mistaken belief 
that a fair auction had extracted the best price the company could 
get.306 As a result, the transaction was neither approved by 
disinterested directors after full disclosure nor fair.307 Though the 
board later affirmed its action after learning of the tip, this seems 
simply to have reinforced the court’s view that the disinterested 
directors lacked any independence of the CEO and COO.308 
Hence, the court was correct to enjoin the transaction based upon 
a straightforward breach of the duty of loyalty and the court’s 
discussion of Revlon was superfluous. 
                                                                                                     
 304. See id. at 1277 (explaining information withheld during a board 
meeting held to evaluate the two bids). 
 305. Confronted with two bids close in price, the financial analysts carrying 
out the auction on behalf of MacMillan decided to conduct an additional round of 
bidding without telling either bidder which bidder was ahead. Id. at 1275 . They 
did tell MacMillan’s CEO and COO the amount of the two bids, and the CEO 
and COO, in turn, passed on the relative status of the bids to the representative 
bidding for the MBO. Id. Knowing it was already ahead, the MBO bidder only 
slightly raised its bid. See id. at 1277 (stating that the MBO bidder increased its 
bid by only $.05 per share). Mistakenly thinking that it was already ahead and 
that the last round was simply an attempt to get it to bid against itself, the 
other bidder did not raise its bid. Id. at 1275–77. Of course, it is possible that 
the MBO bidder might have acted similarly to the other bidder had it remained 
ignorant of the relative status of the two bids. Still, there is no way of knowing 
whether ignorance would, instead, have prompted a more aggressive final bid by 
the MBO bidder. Because the burden of proof is on the directors’ when dealing 
with a conflict-of-interest transaction, the Delaware Supreme Court was correct 
to hold that this unknowable doomed the agreement.  
 306. See id. at 1277 (describing how the board was misled into believing that 
the bidding process was fair). 
 307. See id. at 1282–84 (noting the materiality of the nondisclosure of the 
“tipping” to the other bidder). 
 308. See id. at 1280 (“The board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to 
establish a truly independent auction, free of [the CEO’s] interference and 
access to confidential data.”). 
REMOVING REVLON 1553 
3. QVC 
QVC presents neither the issue of shareholder primacy 
versus protecting other corporate stakeholders at the heart of the 
situation in Revlon or the conflict of interest with a management 
buyout found in MacMillan. The Delaware Supreme Court was 
highly critical of the care exercised by Paramount’s board,309 
which suggests that it might not actually have been necessary to 
go beyond Unocal or even the business judgment rule to condemn 
the board’s actions. If so, then the court’s result was correct and, 
as with MacMillan, the court simply made its opinion 
unnecessarily complex by introducing the discussion of 
heightened scrutiny under Revlon. 
In any event, by holding that shifting control to a single 
person triggered heightened scrutiny under Revlon,310 the QVC 
opinion not only substantially increased the reach of Revlon, but 
also suggested a different sort of rationale for the doctrine. 
Specifically, as its rationale for this trigger, the court expressed 
concern with the loss of effective voting power for the unaffiliated 
shareholders once a single individual owns a majority of a 
corporation’s outstanding voting stock and explained that the 
transaction, in essence, involved the sale of a valuable asset 
belonging to the public shareholders (the ability to obtain a 
premium price for selling control over the corporation).311 This 
rationale, however, simply demonstrates that the decision is an 
important one to the shareholders, both in terms of potential 
upside (the premium they receive for selling control) and 
downside (the dangers they face as minority shareholders once a 
single individual obtains control). Yet, many decisions directors 
make are highly important to the shareholders. Why should this 
alter the court’s approach to the decision? 
Perhaps the argument is one of judicial economy: in other 
words, if a reason for courts deferring to corporate boards is to 
avoid the burden of constantly reviewing board decisions, a rule 
                                                                                                     
 309. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 
(Del. 1994) (“[T]he Paramount Board clearly gave insufficient attention to the 
potential consequences of the defensive measures demanded by Viacom.”). 
 310. See id. at 36 (finding the board’s actions to be subject to the Revlon 
standard). 
 311. Id. at 42–43. 
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that says courts will focus their attention on particularly 
important board decisions might logically follow. A problem with 
this argument is that courts312 and commentators313 generally do 
not point to judicial economy as a rationale behind judicial 
deference to board decisions. Alternately, elementary notions of 
reasonable conduct might suggest that the more important a 
decision, the more time and attention directors should give to it. 
While sensible enough, this observation hardly seems to call for a 
special doctrine as opposed to a common sense application of the 
business judgment rule. One suspects that courts can figure out 
without any special doctrine that while a twenty-minute oral 
presentation is normally more than enough before, say, the board 
recommends that shareholders vote against an advisory proposal 
placed by a shareholder on the corporation’s proxy statement, it 
probably provides insufficient information upon which to vote for 
selling the entire company. Finally, as discussed earlier,314 one 
argument for requiring shareholder approval of mergers and the 
like is that shareholders will pay more attention to more 
important decisions. This shareholder time management 
argument, however, has nothing to do with justifying greater 
judicial scrutiny. 
A further problem, however, with this whole rationale for 
applying heightened scrutiny is that the importance of board 
decisions involves infinite shades of grey in which it is difficult to 
cull out some decisions as particularly critical. So, for example, 
did the decision in QVC really have that much greater impact on 
Paramount’s shareholders than the decision in Time had on 
Time’s shareholders? The Delaware Supreme Court seems to 
think so based upon a notion of reversibility. Specifically, the 
court in Time argued that the Time–Warner merger did not 
preclude Paramount’s acquisition because Paramount could 
simply purchase Time–Warner.315 By contrast, transfer of control 
                                                                                                     
 312. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing 
rationales for the business judgment rule). 
 313. See Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 304–21 (discussing rationales for the 
business judgment rule). 
 314. Supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 315. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150, 1155 (Del. 
1989) (noting that nothing in the agreement precluded Paramount from 
purchasing the combined entity) 
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over Paramount to Mr. Redstone would preempt any later ability 
of Paramount’s shareholders to obtain a premium for selling 
control and permanently place them in a precarious position of 
minority shareholders in a controlled corporation.316 
Yet, this argument overstates the difference between the two 
situations, which, in the end, all comes down to making or losing 
money. So, to return to the situation in Time, both the Warner 
and Paramount mergers seem motivated by some synergy from 
combining cable networks with movie studios.317 Assume, 
however, that combining two movie studios with one cable 
network would at best be redundant and potentially 
counterproductive—which seems to be the thinking behind 
Paramount’s conduct. Assume further that Paramount’s deal was 
better for the Time shareholders than the Warner deal, either 
because there was greater synergy or because Paramount was 
offering them a larger share of the synergistic gains. Under these 
assumptions, if Paramount acquires the combined Time–Warner 
company, much of the gain that the Time stockholders would 
have obtained for themselves in an acquisition of Time by 
Paramount is now shared with the former Warner stockholders. 
After all, the Warner stockholders received a price reflecting 
synergistic gains of the Time–Warner combination, which gains, 
if they do nothing for Paramount, will not result in Paramount 
paying a higher price for the Time–Warner combination.318 
Hence, the Time–Warner merger involved significant irreversible 
consequences for Time’s shareholders; otherwise, of course, there 
would have been no lawsuit by the Time shareholders other than 
Paramount.319 More broadly, the constant stream of corporate 
                                                                                                     
 316. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43 
(Del. 1994). 
 317. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1143 (discussing the motivations for the Time–
Warner merger). 
 318. In other words, under the assumption that combining two movie 
companies with one cable network would be redundant or counterproductive, 
Paramount will simply pay what it would have for Time separately plus what 
Warner would be worth spun off, leaving the Time shareholders uncompensated 
for the extra amount Time paid for the Warner shares based upon the 
synergistic value of a Time–Warner combination. 
 319. In the end, Paramount walked away and married another cable 
network company and years later the Time shareholders could only look back 
wistfully at the premium Paramount offered to pay. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, 
The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 
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bankruptcies testifies to the fact that directors make, or allow 
management to make, irreversibly bad decisions of huge 
importance to the shareholders all the time.320 
B. Other Rationales for the Revlon Doctrine 
Looking at the broader context instead of specific cases, there 
are essentially two rationales one might assert on behalf of the 
Revlon doctrine. The first involves the division of power between 
directors and shareholders; specifically, Revlon substitutes 
judicial review for the functions otherwise provided by 
shareholder consent in situations in which the directors 
circumvent the duel consent model for sales or combinations of 
corporations by avoiding or coercing shareholder consent. The 
other rationale follows the more traditional fiduciary duty 
concern about situations in which directors face incentives that 
might motivate them to slight corporate and shareholder 
interests and argues that the incentives arising in a final period 
bring Revlon situations within this concern. These rationales 
overlap under the argument discussed earlier that the reason for 
requiring shareholder approval of mergers and the like is to deal 
with a final period incentives problem.321 While both of these 
rationales have some superficial appeal, neither provides a 
satisfactory explanation for the Revlon doctrine. 
1. Substituting for Shareholder Consent 
One rationale for the Revlon doctrine follows from viewing 
Revlon in the context of the mutual consent model the law 
imposes upon sales and combinations of corporations. As 
                                                                                                     
N.C. L. REV. 273, 291 n.105 (1991) (pointing out the failure of the Time–Warner 
stock price to match the premium offered by Paramount even several years after 
the merger). 
 320. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 
139–40 (Del. Ch. 2009) (invoking the business judgment rule in dealing with a 
claim that the board allowed managers to lose billions of dollars in CDO 
business, which led to government bailout of Citigroup).  
 321. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the final period 
incentives problem). 
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discussed above, this model calls upon directors to propose and 
shareholders to approve such transactions.322 Revlon and later 
cases applying the doctrine typically involve shotgun corporate 
marriages in which directors seek to bypass or coerce shareholder 
acceptance of a deal favored by the board.323 Perhaps the purpose 
of Revlon is to employ judicial review as a substitute for 
shareholder consent in the case of such shotgun corporate 
marriages. Specifically, the various impacts of Revlon might carry 
out the function(s) otherwise performed by shareholder consent. 
Assessing this rationale begins by asking what function 
shareholder consent to sales and combinations of corporations 
serves. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, there is lack of 
consensus on why the law requires shareholders to approve 
mergers and asset sales.324 Still, a simple, if not simplistic, 
answer is that shareholder consent helps to ensure that these 
transactions are in the interest of the shareholders,325 both in the 
sense that the directors have not sacrificed the interests of the 
shareholders for the interests of others and in the sense that the 
directors succeeded in obtaining a good deal. Matched against 
this objective, one might see how the three arguable impacts 
embedded in the Revlon doctrine could serve as functional 
substitutes for shareholder consent. 
The narrowing of acceptable goals could serve as a substitute 
for shareholder consent if we assume that shareholders, in voting 
on the sale of their company, would not sacrifice maximum price 
for themselves in order to advance the interests of other corporate 
stakeholders, and if we also assume that shareholders, in voting 
on the sale of their company, will focus on immediate market 
values. Of course, it is possible that shareholders might be 
sufficiently altruistic—or sufficiently aware of the impact which 
                                                                                                     
 322. See supra notes 20–21, 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing the 
roles of directors and shareholders). 
 323. Revlon, MacMillan, and QVC all involved challenges to significant lock-
ups for the favored bidders. See supra notes 126, 159, 303 and accompanying 
text (noting protective devices used in those cases). 
 324. Supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 325. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and 
Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1425, 1505 (1991) (“The shareholders are in the best position to weigh the 
competing alternatives; given substantial, if not perfect, information from both 
sides, the shareholders’ vote must be afforded great weight.”). 
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the treatment of creditors, employees and the like might have on 
other companies in their stock portfolios326—that they would 
agree to transactions in which they did not receive top dollar at 
the expense of other constituencies. Alternately, it is possible that 
shareholders might be sufficiently heterogeneous in their 
valuations of potential combinations such that they would not 
rely on market valuations in choosing between bids.327 In either 
case, Revlon would go beyond being a functional substitute for 
shareholder consent to the extent it limits the permissible goal 
for a corporate sale to the highest price for the shareholders. 
Heightened judicial scrutiny of the wisdom of the directors’ 
decision, potentially coupled with mandated processes directors 
must follow to establish that they obtained the best deal for the 
shareholders, might serve as a functional substitute for a 
shareholder vote in ensuring that the directors made a good deal. 
In this instance, judicial review places the court in the position of 
a super-shareholder whose judgment serves as a surrogate for an 
un-coerced shareholder vote.328 
Of course, all this assumes that shareholder consent plays an 
important role in protecting shareholder interests. If instead 
shareholder approval is simply an unnecessary vestige hanging 
on from traditions transported into corporate law from 
partnership and contract law,329 then it is unnecessary to create a 
functional substitute through judicial review. Alternately, if 
shareholder consent is seen as a value for its own sake, perhaps 
in the sense of providing democratic legitimacy to fundamental 
constitutional changes, then judicial review is not a functional 
substitute. 
So far, the notion that Revlon provides a functional 
substitute for shareholder consent looks quite plausible. Things 
                                                                                                     
 326. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (noting a possible reason 
why shareholders might consider the interests of other stakeholders). 
 327. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? 
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1244–52 
(1990) (arguing that because of heterogeneous expectations, shareholders often 
value their stock differently than the market price).  
 328. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (establishing 
liability merely because the court disagrees with what the directors did would 
inappropriately turn the court into a super-director). 
 329. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting the historic, 
contractual basis for requiring shareholder consent). 
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start to break down, however, when one compares the boundaries 
of the Revlon doctrine to the situations in which directors have 
circumvented requirements for shareholder consent to sales and 
combinations of corporations.  
Time is all about directors circumventing the requirement for 
shareholder consent. The Time–Warner combination avoided a 
requirement under Delaware law for a vote by Time’s 
shareholders by structuring the deal as a triangular merger of 
Warner with a Time subsidiary rather than a merger into Time 
itself.330 Hence, the shareholder on the Time side who voted on 
the merger was Time, acting through a decision of its board, not 
its shareholders.331 Under the original structure of the deal, 
however, stock exchange rules demanded a vote by Time 
shareholders because of the quantity of stock that Time would 
issue to the Warner shareholders in the merger.332 Time’s board 
triggered the lawsuit by changing the consideration given to the 
Warner shareholders from Time stock to cash and securities.333 
The motive for this was to remove the requirement under the 
stock exchange rules that Time’s shareholders get to vote on the 
deal.334 Yet, the Delaware courts held that depriving Time’s 
shareholders of a vote did not trigger Revlon.335 This is hardly 
consistent with the notion that the purpose of Revlon is to 
substitute heightened judicial scrutiny for shareholder consent.336 
                                                                                                     
 330. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1145–46 (Del. 
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Perhaps the notion is that Revlon should serve as a 
substitute for shareholder consent when directors may have 
coerced such consent by deal protection devices but not when 
directors have avoided the requirement for such consent 
altogether by the structure of the deal. If so, one must work hard 
to justify such a distinction. Moreover, the boundaries of Revlon 
are not co-terminus with situations in which there are deal 
protection devices with potentially coercive impact. Specifically, 
Revlon does not reach transactions having deal protection devices 
unless the transactions involve the break-up or dissolution of the 
target after an auction or in response to a hostile bid or else 
involve the sale of control as defined in QVC. Hence, the 
Delaware Supreme Court refused to apply Revlon in Santa Fe 
Pacific despite the fact that the merger agreement with the 
favored bidder included deal protection devices.337 
Maybe this simply goes to show that the boundaries of 
Revlon need redesign. Specifically, under this analysis, the 
boundaries of Revlon should match the situations in which boards 
have avoided or coerced shareholder consent. Yet, this may 
simply worsen the problems the Delaware courts face in 
determining the borders of Revlon. A pragmatic argument in 
favor of the Delaware Supreme Court’s rejection in Hariton of 
attempting through the de facto merger doctrine to create 
equivalent shareholder rights despite differences in deal 
structure is the inevitably difficult line drawing problems this 
would entail.338 Determining the impact of deal protection devices 
on shareholder choice also can be challenging.339 Ultimately, the 
only way to resolve this line drawing problem is to have a 
coherent theory for when shareholders should possess the right to 
an uncoerced vote on a transaction and when deal protection 
devices sufficiently constrain the shareholder vote so as to fatally 
undermine the vote’s efficacy. If, however, there is such a 
                                                                                                     
 337. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 64, 71 (Del. 
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coherent theory, the question will become why we need Revlon. 
Specifically, the substitute for shareholder consent rationale 
proposes a presumably second best solution without asking why 
one is settling for second best. Instead of establishing judicial 
review as a substitute for uncoerced shareholder consent, maybe 
the answer is to preserve uncoerced shareholder consent. If there 
is a coherent theory to provide guidelines for when the law should 
require shareholder consent then it would become relatively 
straightforward for the legislature or the courts to adopt rules 
preserving the requirement for shareholder consent despite 
differences in deal structure that do not, under the theory, justify 
avoiding such consent.340 Similarly, if there is a point at which 
one can say that a deal protection device fatally interferes with 
the efficacy of a shareholder vote critical to protecting the 
shareholders’ interest, a simple solution may be to ban such a 
deal protection device.341 
2. The Final Period Incentives Rationale 
The alternate rationale for the Revlon doctrine returns to 
traditional fiduciary duty analysis. As discussed earlier, this 
analysis starts with courts granting deference to board decisions 
under the business judgment rule.342 The justification for any 
greater level of scrutiny normally comes from concerns with 
conflicts of interest that might cause the directors to sacrifice 
corporate or shareholder interests to advance the interests of the 
directors themselves or of those with significant affiliations to the 
directors.343 Fitting Revlon into this justification means finding 
some conflict of interest on the part of directors in situations 
covered by the doctrine. 
                                                                                                     
 340. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200 et. seq. (2000) (creating parallel 
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 341. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to ban 
lock-ups that meet certain criteria). 
 342. Supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
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Revlon itself involved favoritism for a white knight brought 
in to defeat a hostile tender offer.344 As such, the court seemingly 
faced the positional conflict of interest present in takeover 
defenses. Still, this does not call for a new rule with increased 
scrutiny because the Unocal doctrine already provides added 
scrutiny of takeover defenses. 
Actually, the white knight situation would generally seem to 
call for less, rather than more, scrutiny than otherwise applied 
under Unocal. This is because the white knight situation 
typically presents less positional conflict of interest than a 
situation in which the target corporation remains independent. 
After all, the positional conflict of interest arises from the normal 
desire of those in power to retain their power. A sale to a white 
knight presumably will lessen the power of the target’s directors. 
The greatest reduction in the power of the target’s directors, and 
accordingly the weakest positional conflict, occurs in a sale 
leading to the dissolution or bust-up of the target that would not 
leave a corporation for the target’s directors to direct. Yet, this is 
the transaction that occurred in Revlon.345 Even if the target 
corporation continues, and even if the white knight keeps the 
target’s pre-acquisition directors on the target’s board, they now 
answer to a single shareholder instead of enjoying the freedom 
made possible when stock is widely scattered among the 
rationally apathetic.346 In fact, the worst positional conflict in the 
white knight situation occurs if the transaction entails a so-called 
merger of equals between public companies in which the target’s 
directors end up on the board of a corporation without a 
controlling shareholder and so have lost little power at all. Yet, 
this is the situation least likely covered by Revlon.347 
Perhaps the target’s executives will continue to manage the 
company or a significant operational component after the white 
knight purchases control. Even so, this would still seem to 
present less of a conflict of interest than a decision to remain 
                                                                                                     
 344. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 
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independent. This is because Revlon involves a challenge to a 
decision by the board and not by the executives.348 Of course, 
some executives may also be directors. More broadly, a realistic 
assessment of board dynamics commonly shows the influence 
possessed by executives, and especially the CEO, over outside 
directors.349 Still, belief in the ability of nominally disinterested 
directors to protect the corporation from executive conflicts reigns 
as a central tenet of corporate law. This is evidenced by section 
144 of Delaware’s corporation law, which allows the vote of 
disinterested directors to cure conflicts of interest by directors or 
officers.350 Indeed, the most dramatic conflict-of-interest 
transaction involving corporate executives, the setting of their 
compensation, generally falls within the business judgment rule 
by virtue of disinterested director approval.351 In any event, even 
if one viewed the target’s board to be the supine tool of the 
target’s executives or such executives are on the board, and even 
if some of those executives maintain executive positions after the 
white knight takes over, this would still not change the basic 
calculation that the positional conflict of interest is weaker with a 
white knight than with takeover defenses that would keep the 
target independent. After all, despite keeping their executive 
positions, the target’s executives have gone from a situation in 
which, by hypothesis, they were on or able to control the board 
ostensibly supervising them, to a situation in which the 
presumably more independently minded managers of the white 
knight now have ultimate control. 
Of course, if corporate directors or executives take a 
significant financial stake in the white knight purchaser (as in an 
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MBO), then the conflict of interest in the transaction rises above 
being simply a positional conflict of interest of directors seeking 
to keep their control. Now, however, we are back to the 
protections already accorded the corporation from conflict-of-
interest transactions with firms in which their directors or 
officers have a material financial interest. As discussed above 
when addressing MacMillan,352 these protections can deal with 
managerial overreach in MBO transactions without the need to 
invoke Revlon. 
Even so, many scholars attempt to justify Revlon as 
necessary to deal with side deals the target firm’s management 
might make with a bidder under which the target’s directors will 
favor the bidder in exchange for future employment or the like.353 
The simple answer, however, is to recognize the conflict of 
interest such side deals can create and invoke the higher scrutiny 
required of conflict-of-interest transactions.354 By contrast, 
attempting to address the problem of side deals by invoking the 
Revlon doctrine is both under-inclusive insofar as Revlon does not 
apply to the host of corporate sales in which there could be a side 
deal and over-inclusive insofar as Revlon subjects sales in which 
there is no side deal to heightened scrutiny.355 
The question thus becomes whether there is some conflict of 
interest inherent in Revlon situations that is not otherwise 
addressed either by normal duty of loyalty analysis or by Unocal. 
Academic commentary,356 joined by some Chancery Court 
opinions,357 asserts that the final period incentives problem 
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presents such a conflict of interest. The final period incentives 
rationale begins with the observation that directors and 
executives face a variety of constraints on engaging in poor 
behavior (disloyal or careless conduct) or, put more positively, 
have a variety of incentives for doing a good job. For example, 
poor performance by directors and executives might hurt the 
corporation in product markets and markets for capital, which, in 
turn, can impact compensation and job security of corporate 
managers, while good corporate performance in product and 
capital markets can yield increased compensation and job 
security.358 Good reputation resulting from good performance 
might also impact executives and directors as they compete for 
advancement in labor markets both internal and external to the 
corporation, while poor performance will have the opposite 
effect.359 Dissatisfaction by those holding the ultimate power to 
dismiss executives (more senior executives and directors) or 
directors (the shareholders) impacts job security, creating an 
incentive to keep more senior executives, directors, and 
shareholders happy.360 
Many of these constraints and incentives lose their force if 
directors or executives learn that the corporation will cease 
operations or that new owners plan to terminate existing 
directors or executives. So, if directors and executives learn that 
the corporation will terminate operations, their concern with 
maintaining the corporation’s competitive position in product and 
capital markets ceases to be a motivating factor. Alternately, if 
directors and executives learn that new owners plan their 
removal—even though continuing corporate operations—the 
directors and executives will no longer worry about maintaining 
job security or seeking advancement within this corporation. 
This, in turn, creates the argument that sales leading to the bust-
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up or dissolution of the corporation or to a change in control over 
the corporation (Revlon situations) produce a final period between 
the time it becomes obvious that corporate operations will 
terminate or directors and executives will lose their positions and 
the actual termination or removal.361 During this time, directors 
and executives have less incentive toward good performance. 
This final period rationale is different in a fundamental way 
from the conflict-of-interest concerns that traditionally lead to 
increased scrutiny of board decisions. With conflicts of interest, 
directors face incentives that affirmatively encourage them to act 
in ways contrary to the corporation’s or the shareholders’ 
interests. So, in a transaction between a director and the 
corporation in which he or she is a director, the director has an 
incentive to give him or herself a better deal than the corporation 
receives. Less extreme, but still similar, the normal human desire 
to retain power, not to mention whatever compensation or 
perquisites go with the position, give directors an incentive to 
oppose hostile tender offers that might be in the corporation’s or 
shareholders’ interest. By contrast, the final period argument, in 
itself, does not posit any incentive that affirmatively encourages 
directors to sacrifice corporate or shareholder interests. Rather, 
the argument is that the directors will not have as much 
incentive as they normally do to make the right decision for the 
corporation and its shareholders. In other words, the concern is 
not with bad incentives but with less good incentives. 
This distinction, in turn, suggests the need for great caution 
before applying heightened scrutiny merely because the situation 
involves a final period problem. Corporate law already faces a 
difficult challenge when dealing with conflicts of interest in which 
directors have affirmative incentives to sacrifice corporate or 
shareholder welfare in favor of personal ends. This is because the 
bipolar approach—great deference under the business judgment 
rule versus intense scrutiny under the fairness test—fits 
awkwardly when matched against the reality that directors 
commonly face a host of subtle conflicts of various degrees that 
may affirmatively encourage them to sacrifice corporate or 
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shareholder interests.362 On rare occasions, Unocal being one, 
courts have responded to this reality by creating intermediate 
levels of review.363 By and large, however, courts have eschewed 
such an approach. The reason is simple: such an approach would 
create an extraordinarily difficult level of complexity in 
application.364 
This complexity would increase exponentially if, in addition 
to applying new levels of scrutiny when presented with all the 
sort of conflicts that affirmatively entice directors to disregard 
corporate or shareholder interests, courts also applied different 
levels of scrutiny to situations in which there are reduced 
incentives encouraging directors to advance corporate and 
shareholder interests. This is because there are a host of 
situations beyond the final period problem associated with the 
sale of a corporation in which directors may have reduced 
incentives toward optimal performance. 
To begin with, the final period situation involving the sale of 
a corporation is not the only final period situation, and, indeed, 
may not even be the most important final period situation. The 
inevitability of aging presents each director and executive with 
his or her own final period situation. The impact of Van Gorkom’s 
impending retirement on the events in the Van Gorkom case 
provides an example of this.365 By contrast, directors or 
executives in mid-career may have plenty of incentive to do a 
good job in order to preserve their reputation and position in the 
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managerial labor market even if they will never face another 
election by the target’s shareholders or review by seniors within 
the target corporation.366 Beyond this, compensation schemes and 
stock ownership create different degrees of incentive toward good 
performance.367 Does this mean courts should apply a higher 
degree of scrutiny to a board decision if the directors do not own 
much stock in their corporation or do not receive compensation 
dependent upon corporate performance and so may have limited 
financial incentives for making good decisions? How about 
directors of nonprofit corporations who may not receive any 
compensation?368 Should their decisions be subjected to stricter 
scrutiny because of less financial incentive to do a good job? As 
suggested by this last example, outside directors on a corporate 
board can have complex motives for being directors369 and, in 
turn, for performance. An outside director who is highly 
accomplished in his or her primary position might have far less 
incentive for good performance than a director for which this 
board position creates greater impacts on career prospects and 
satisfaction. Should courts apply higher scrutiny to boards with 
larger numbers of more accomplished directors? 
Perhaps one might attempt to distinguish these other 
reduced incentive situations from the final period problem arising 
with the sale of the company by arguing that the problem here is 
a combination of less good incentives with more bad incentives. 
Specifically, when selling the corporation, the combination of a 
final period situation with the former owners and an anticipated 
relationship with the new owner(s) can give managers an 
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incentive to favor prematurely the interest of the expected new 
owner(s) over the interest of the departing owners in negotiating 
the sale. Indeed, this might suggest a different sort of rationale 
for the distinction drawn in Time and QVC between sales leaving 
control in the market and sales to controlling individuals. One 
might argue that so long as control remains in the market, 
managers have an incentive to avoid developing a reputation for 
being willing to sell out the set of public investors to which they 
had a duty at the time because the public investors after the 
transaction will not trust such managers not to do the same to 
them in the future. On the other hand, the same thinking could 
be true even when the new controlling owner is an individual. 
Managers might think twice before beginning their relationship 
with their new boss with actions that will give their new boss 
grounds to suspect their future trustworthiness.370 Moreover, 
while this shifting loyalties rationale might explain Revlon in sale 
of control situations, it does not fit break-up or dissolution of the 
corporation situations in which managers will not retain their 
positions. In any event, this seems to bring us back to the 
previous discussion of white knights and side deals and how 
existing doctrines can address this without Revlon. 
Beyond all this, the final period argument is entirely upside 
down. To the extent that it often focuses on executives rather 
than directors, it is, as pointed out above,371 looking at the wrong 
people: Revlon involves challenges to decisions by the board. 
Focusing on the board, what exactly is the constraint on the 
board’s conduct that the final period removes? The answer is that 
the directors will no longer face the need to go before the target’s 
shareholders for reelection; in political parlance, they are lame 
ducks. Of course, given how infrequently directors of publicly 
traded companies are deposed in an election,372 one must question 
how much of a constraint actually arises from the need to keep 
the shareholder electorate happy. The more realistic threat for a 
                                                                                                     
 370. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 84, at 1811 (noting that the 
buyer may perceive target management as a liability if it acts disloyally to the 
former shareholders).  
 371. Supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 372. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 
VA. L. REV. 675, 682–83 (2007) (reporting the small number of contested proxy 
solicitations). 
1570 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013) 
poorly performing board typically lies in removal through a 
hostile tender offer.373 This suggests that the final period problem 
is something of a mirror to the positional conflict of interest that 
directors face in responding to a hostile tender offer.  
Yet, the incentive problem in a final period situation is only a 
pale reflection of the incentive at work in the hostile takeover 
situation. In the final period situation, the directors lose the 
incentive for good performance that arose before the final period 
from the abstract concern that at some future time a sufficiently 
poor level of corporate performance might lead to a threat to their 
continued control. By contrast, when facing a hostile tender offer, 
the directors confront the immediate and real prospect of being 
dethroned. One does not need an exhaustive search into the 
literature on psychology to recognize that people will react much 
more to the immediate and concrete than to the abstract and 
future.374 What this means is that efforts to remain independent 
in the face of an impending hostile takeover always present a 
greater danger of directors acting contrary to shareholder 
interests than the final period problem creates by rendering 
irrelevant concerns of more distant threat to one’s position.375 
Hence, the notion that the final period situation justifies greater 
scrutiny under the Revlon doctrine than the threat of a hostile 
takeover calls for under Unocal is wrong. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In the end, the Revlon doctrine has been an expensive 
distraction, consuming countless billable hours and valuable 
judicial time arguing over whether the doctrine applies—most 
recently in the continuing controversy over whether cash bids by 
public companies trigger Revlon.376 Such arguments seem more 
suited to medieval monks than to corporate attorneys and a 
sophisticated judiciary, given that no one is really sure what the 
doctrine does anyway and no one has put forth a persuasive 
rationale for having the doctrine. It is time to remove Revlon from 
the face of corporate law. 
  
                                                                                                     
 376. See supra notes 172–94 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of 
how Revlon is triggered). 
